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Abstract 
The main purpose of this research is to understand the nature of the relationship 
between leftist armed guerrillas and indigenous rights in the Latin American region. I 
argue that the ethnic component and indigenous mobilization have greatly determined the 
political and social achievements of Marxist insurgencies active in many countries of the 
sub-continent during the second half of the twentieth century.  
In order to test my hypothesis, I devote particular attention to the historical 
exposition and critical analysis of both the ethnic problem and Marxism, in its European, 
Russian, Chinese, and Latin American versions.  
Subsequently, I focus on the case studies of Guatemala and Peru, as exemplary of 
different results obtained by radical armed groups. The Guatemalan civil war and its 
outcome demonstrate the importance of indigenous people’s mobilization for the partial 
success and reintegration into civil life of Marxist guerrilla movements. Conversely, the 
Peruvian conflict points out the dangers of a dogmatic ideology that led to unprecedented 
violence and sparked state authoritarianism and populism. 
The critical assessment of the two case studies is carried out in a qualitative 
manner and takes into account two main variables, namely the armed groups’ degree of 
support for indigenous grievances and their level of dogmatism. My hypothesis proves to 
be valid, at least in the cases of Guatemala and Peru, as I discover that a high level of 
support for the ethnic question coupled with a low level of dogmatism of the leftist 
insurgencies is linked to higher indigenous mobilization and relatively better 
performances of the armed guerrillas.   
  2 
As a consequence of these findings, I expand my analysis to the whole Latin 
American region and to other countries beyond this area, also challenged by the threat of 
political violence linked to both radical ideology and ethnicity. I conclude by highlighting 
the importance of the nation building process for the prevention of further instability and 
by recommending a manifold approach that factors the reintegration of armed groups 
members into society and the creation of a participatory state. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 - Description of the issue 
Latin American countries share the burden of a colonial past whose traces are still 
very much evident today. Since the Spanish conquest, the indigenous population has 
suffered an exploitation that has gone well beyond economics and has resulted in a 
separation, both physical and social, between the native people and the descendants of the 
European colonizers. The reactions of indigenous people to this protracted inequality 
have oscillated between resignation and rebellion,1 the latter being used more routinely 
from the beginning of the 20th century.2 It is indeed in this century that the so-called 
“ethnic question,” namely the presence of ethnic cleavages generated by colonialism and 
aggravated by authoritarian regimes, has dangerously shown its potential for conflict. 
When Communist ideology began to spread in the American sub-continent, 
fuelled by the success of the Cuban Revolution (1959), it encountered a favorable terrain 
in the grievances of Indians. Countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia experienced the phenomenon of armed 
insurgencies starting from the first decades of 1900 as a consequence of the “agrarian, 
regional, ethnic, and national problem”3 that had not been addressed for centuries. While 
indigenous participation in armed rebellions varied across nations and across years, it can 
                                                
1 Degregori, Carlos Iván. “Com’è difficile essere Dio. Ideologia e Violenza Politica di Sendero Luminoso,” 
in La Ricerca Folklorica, Vol. 28 (Oct. 1993): p. 35, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/148013, 
(accessed on 6 November 2010) and Tamayo Herrera, José. Liberalismo, indigenismo y violencia en los 
países andinos (1850-1995). Fondo de Desarrollo Editorial, Universidad de Lima: Lima (1998): p. 20. 
2 Tamayo Herrera, p. 20. 
3 Lora Cam, Jorge. El EZLN y Sendero Luminoso. Radicalismo de izquierda y confrontación político-
militar en América Latina. Benemérita Univesidad Autónoma de Puebla: Puebla, Mexico (1999): p. 11. 
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be argued that the ethnic question has been one of the root causes of political violence in 
Latin America.  
Yet scholars’ approach to political instability in this region has usually focused on 
one side of the problem only: how to eradicate the scourge of armed insurgencies in order 
to achieve a fully democratic rule in the sub-continent. Little understanding of the “past 
and present situation”4 of the countries involved was applied by policy-makers and 
academics, who seemed more interested in “democratizing” the area according to a 
“Western” model.5 Only recently have political analysts concentrated on the link between 
a specific attribute that most Latin American nations share, namely the presence of a 
consistent indigenous population, and the actions and repercussions of leftist insurgencies 
on native people’s rights.6 It is my belief that the ethnic element of the Marxist armed 
groups that emerged in this region has been a critical aspect of their alleged success or 
lack thereof. This is why further investigation is needed on this subject, in order to shed 
light on two phenomena, leftist insurgencies and Indians’ rights, which in my view are 
dialectically connected. 
This study will aim at filling some of the gaps identified by my research on Latin 
American insurgencies. Its main purpose will be to evaluate the above-mentioned 
relationship between Marxist guerrilla warfare and the interests and rights of indigenous 
people by examining the Guatemalan and the Peruvian civil wars as case studies. First 
                                                
4 O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Illusions about Consolidation”, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, 2 (1996): p. 47, 
available at http://muse.jhu.edu.ccny-
proxy1.libr.ccny.cuny.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v007/7.2odonnell.html                            
(accessed on 4 February 2011). 
5 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
6 To quote a few of them: Jorge Lora Cam (see footnote 3, p. 1), Harold José Rizo Otero (Evolución del 
Conflicto Armado en Colombia e Iberoamérica. Corporación Universitaria Autónoma de Occidente: 
Bogotá, 2002), James F. Rochlin (Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico. 
Lynne Rienner Publisher: Boulder London, 2003), and the previously mentioned José Tamayo Herrera. 
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and foremost, I will analyze the viability of armed revolution within the context of the 
indigenous condition of isolation and discrimination. Can the Marxist concept of class 
conflict be successfully applied to the native population, mainly peasants (campesinos), 
with a unique link to their land derived from their tradition and culture? More 
importantly, have Marxist theories, as outlined in the various armed groups’ action 
programs, represented a satisfying and real solution to the ethnic question? Have they 
contributed to lifting native people out of poverty and discrimination? 
I will subsequently assess Marxist armed groups’ performance with regard to the 
indigenous question against the backdrop of neo-liberalist economic strategies and a neo-
colonial structure of the State. I seek to discover whether radical leftist approaches to 
politics have actually offered a better platform for native people to advocate for the 
advancement of their social and economic rights. I will therefore identify both positive 
and negative aspects of armed insurgencies, with a view to obtain an unbiased and 
comprehensive evaluation of their activities, always analyzed from an ethnic point of 
view. In this regard, it will be important to consider not only economic theoretical 
frameworks (neo-liberalism and different Marxist approaches, such as dependency 
theory),7 but also anthropologic considerations with reference to the inherent complexity 
and the altered perception of the Indian identity throughout the years. 
Aside from the regional implications highlighted in the previous paragraphs, my 
research has a twofold international relevance: on the one hand, left-wing armed 
                                                
7 Dependency theory arose in Latin America in 1960s and sought to explain the protracted 
underdevelopment of the region through a global northern exploitation of the global South, which occurred 
in three phases: the era of colonialism, the era of industrialization, and the era of the Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs). Dependency theory is believed to be connected to the foundation of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 as well as to the United Nations’ 
“voting blocs” of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 (Notes from the International Political 
Economy class of 1 March 2010 and Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. ed., Making sense of International Relations 
Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2006: 199-207.) For more details, see Chapter 3, Section 4. 
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guerrillas continue to challenge States’ authority in Latin America and elsewhere, posing 
a threat to national and international security and health (these movements are often 
funded through transnational drug trafficking). Increasingly, extremist insurgencies using 
terror as a tactic are perceived as a serious menace by the international community and 
scholars often link their ideological character to an unresolved ethnic question, as in the 
cases of the Maoist rebels of India and Nepal.8 By systematically focusing on ethnicity 
and not only on the ideology of the specific guerrilla movement, one can grasp the 
problem of non-State armed group violence with a holistic approach and, thus, a more 
thorough understanding. This is true for the Latin American region as well as for the rest 
of the world.  
On the other hand, the global indigenous movement that found its momentum in 
the 1980s, in part as an unexpected “positive” consequence of armed insurgencies, has 
widened the perspective towards human rights and multiculturalism. In reference to the 
former aspect, native people’s rights represented a new addition to the broader regime of 
human rights and contributed to a shift in domestic politics of many countries, such as 
Canada, Brazil, or Australia, that were not recognizing these specific rights before. As a 
result of the acknowledgment of indigenous rights by certain countries, multiculturalism 
has acquired a growing importance in contemporary states’ approaches to state building, 
due to the fact that the ethnic element of a country’s population cannot be ignored or 
“assimilated” any longer. In this connection, the whole concept of “nation-state” has 
proved insufficient, as the geographical reality not always matches the cultural one. 
                                                
8 See Murshed, S. Mansoob, and Scott Gates. “Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal,” in Review of Development Economics, Vol. 9, 1 (2005): 121-134, available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ccny-proxy1.libr.ccny.cuny.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00267.x/pdf, 
(accessed on 10 December 2010). 
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Political instability and social well being increasingly depend on how and whether under 
or non-represented minorities are reflected in a country’s legislation. This, in turn, shapes 
the amount of resources that are allocated to citizens: the higher the inequality, the 
likelier the rebellion, especially if this inequality has been protracted in time and 
consistently directed to a part of the population, in what Collier describes as “ethnic 
dominance.”9 It is clear that the ethnic problem is therefore a main issue that 
governments worldwide need to address, in order to gain legitimacy within the different 
strata of their society. 
1.2 - Hypothesis 
In my work I will argue that Marxist insurgencies and indigenous mobilization are 
reciprocally connected and that the latter crucially determines the performance of the 
former. Radical armed groups could not succeed in achieving genuine change without the 
active participation of native populations. Vice versa, I expect to find out that Marxist 
theories’ contribution to the indigenous cause is limited, especially due to an ideological 
rigidity that hinders a full understanding of the specific social and cultural diversity of the 
indio. 
In order to test my hypothesis, I will examine two case studies, which I deem 
representative of radically different outcomes in the interactions of the guerrillas with the 
Indians and exemplary of the Central American and the Andean region. The case of 
Guatemala, a country ravaged by more than 30 years of civil war, presents a positive 
interaction between indigenous interests and ideological fight, exemplified by the 1996 
Peace Accords with the Guatemalan government, which advocated for substantial 
                                                
9 Collier, Paul. Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy. World Bank: 
Washington DC (April 2006): p. 14. 
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reforms of the country, including indigenous rights. Conversely, the Shining Path of Peru 
is an emblematic case of the need for a dismissal of dogmatism in Marxist armed 
insurgencies. My research shows that the Peruvian internal conflict has sharpened social 
fragmentation without properly addressing the ethnic question.  
1.3 - Methodology 
The two case studies will represent the core of my thesis paper. From their 
analysis I will infer a set of lessons learned that could be applied to other countries in the 
Latin American region and beyond it, facing the double challenge of radical armed 
groups and ethnic violence. My research does not feature a separate literature review 
section, because the analysis of the sources consulted is incorporated into each chapter 
and serves as a starting point of discussion for the topic presented.  
I intend to gather information regarding the Guatemalan and the Peruvian civil 
wars from comparative studies found in books and journal articles, such as Jeffery M. 
Paige’s Social Theory and Peasant Revolution in Vietnam and Guatemala10 and Jorge 
Lora Cam’s El EZLN y Sendero Luminoso. Radicalismo de izquierda y confrontación 
político-militar en América Latina.11 In addition, my research will greatly benefit from 
primary sources (interviews) found in Betsy Konefal’s work on Mayan political and 
social mobilization during the Guatemalan civil war12 as well as from Santiago 
Roncagliolo’s biography of the leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán.13 Both 
                                                
10 M. Paige, Jeffery. “Social Theory and Peasant Revolution in Vietnam and Guatemala,” in Theory and 
Society, Vol. 12, 6 (Nov. 1983), available at http: //www.jstor.org/stable/657292, (accessed on 7 November 
2010). 
11 See footnote 3, p. 3. 
12 Konefal, Betsy. For Every Indio Who Falls. A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala, 1960-1990. 
University of New Mexico Press: Albuquerque (2010). 
13 Roncagliolo, Santiago. La cuarta espada. La historia de Abimael Guzmán y Sendero Luminoso. Debate: 
Buenos Aires (2007). 
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books offer an insightful analysis of the two civil wars by simultaneously focusing on the 
political and cultural aspects of the countries examined.  
When presenting the economic and social background of Guatemala and Peru, I 
will gather quantitative data found in books and journal articles. Figures obtained mainly 
from the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions reports14 of the two countries and from 
historical sources15 will allow me to assess indigenous political mobilization and 
governments’ consequent repression, with a view to determine the extent to which native 
people’s rights have been violated during the internal conflicts and whether this has 
contributed to their participation in the conflict itself. 
These data notwithstanding, my work will remain essentially an evaluative one, 
relying mainly on a qualitative approach. The focus will lie on the careful analysis of the 
Guatemalan and Peruvian case studies with a specific attention to their ethnic aspect and 
a subsequent critical judgment of these internal conflicts’ outcome.  
1.4 – Chapter outline 
To this end, I plan to divide my thesis research into an introduction, five chapters, 
a conclusion, and a bibliography section. So far, the present introduction has outlined the 
main purposes of my study, presenting a short background of the problem, introducing 
both the main questions I aim to answer in the following chapters and the hypothesis that 
                                                
14 Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala), report available at 
http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/mds/spanish/toc.html, (accessed on 12 December 2010) and Comisión de 
la Verdad y Reconciliación (Peru), report available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/conclusiones.php, 
(accessed on 12 December 2010). 
15 Such as Jim Handy’s Gift of the Devil. A History of Guatemala. and The Peru Reader (Handy, Jim. Gift 
of the Devil. A History of Guatemala. South End Press: United States, 1984; Starn, Orin, Carlos Iván 
Degregori, and Robin Kirk, ed. The Peru Reader. History, Culture, Politics. Duke University Press: 
Durham and London, 1995). 
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will be confirmed or disproved by the two case studies under examination, in addition to 
dedicating a specific section describing the methodology I opted for.  
The second chapter will offer a deep and comprehensive background of the ethnic 
question in the Latin American region and in Guatemala and Peru, specifically. Basic 
knowledge of colonialism and state authoritarianism in the sub-continent are essential to 
determining the root causes of this issue, while the status of native people during the 
twentieth century will be a key element to the analysis of the proposed case studies. 
Moreover, I will draw upon anthropologic investigations and cultural literature on 
indigenismo, intended as a broad field encompassing ethnology, anthropology, 
indigenous culture, and Government’s policies towards indigenous populations.16 I will 
subsequently move on to discuss the global indigenous rights’ movement, which found 
its universal recognition in 1989 with the adoption of the International Labor 
Organization’s Convention 169 (Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries). The significance of such a legally binding document for the 
substantive development of native populations’ rights will be reiterated, in that it 
acknowledges the right of non-discrimination, the right to self-identification and self-
determination, the right to social and political development, and the right of consultation 
in matters that affect native populations’ interests.17 Moreover, the Convention clearly 
limits the use of the adjective “indigenous” to those people who “retain some or all of 
                                                
16 Barabas, Alicia M. “La Construcción del Indio como Bárbaro: de la Etnografía al Indigenismo,” in 
Alteridades, Vol. 10, 19 (2000): 10, available at http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/, (accessed on 10 December 
2010). 
17 International Labor Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries. Geneva, 27 June 1989, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C169, (accessed on 6 November 2010) and United Nations General Assembly, United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. New York, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295, 
available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement, (accessed on 6 November 
2010).  
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their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.”18 The overall intention of 
the chapter is to establish a theoretical foundation against which evaluating the actual 
achievements of Marxist insurgencies, whose ideology and main aspects will be the 
subject of the third chapter. 
At that stage, I will concentrate on the presentation of the main tenets of Marxism, 
described as a theoretical approach stemming from the ideas of Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels that has come to include several strains of thought, from world-system theory to 
Gramscian analysis. I will build on the conspicuous literature on this subject, including 
the analysis of primary sources,19 and rely on Kolakowski’s Main Currents of Marxism 
for their interpretation.20 I will then proceed on identifying the main points of the 
European, Russian, and Chinese strands of Marxism and compare them to the Latin 
American ones, mainly by introducing dependency theory as the most important local 
approach to historical-structural views. In this connection, I will give a brief overview of 
the economic situation of the Latin American regions by presenting the reflections of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
which greatly influenced proponents of dependency theory. By the end of this chapter, 
the link between Marxist insurgencies and indigenous rights will take shape. The analysis 
of Marxist theories, with their inherently pessimistic view of world politics as a perpetual 
conflict between the dominant class (bourgeoisie) and the exploited class (proletariat) is 
fundamental to the partial addressing of some of the questions formulated in the 
introduction.  
                                                
18 ILO Convention 169. 
19 I intend to analyze Marx’ The Communist Manisfesto and A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. 
20 Kolakowski, Leszek. Main Currents of Marxism. The Founders. The Golden Age. The Breakdown. W. 
W. Norton & Company: New York, London (2005). 
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Coupled with the considerations made in the previous chapter, this part of my work 
will shed more light on the actual viability of leftist armed revolution in the specific 
context of Latin America, a region whose indigenous populations’ identity represents 
both a distinctive trait and a decisive variable in the effectiveness of governments and 
non-state armed groups alike. I believe that the accurate review of the programs of action 
and main ideological beliefs of the guerrilla movements present in Guatemala and Peru 
will constitute a solid frame to my hypothesis, which I will start testing in the following 
chapters. 
The Guatemalan civil conflict will be the subject of the fourth chapter. I will begin by 
presenting an exhaustive historical background, including the frequent change of 
governments and the shift of alliances between the elites, the bourgeoisie, and the 
peasants. One could trace back the root causes of the conflict in the authoritarian nature 
of the State, as well as in the changes in the organization of production that triggered a 
violent class conflict between the landowners (supported by the military) and a migratory 
population of campesinos and wage workers. In fact, the shift from the traditional 
hacienda (plantation or estate) and a substantive change in Guatemalan exports (cotton, 
sugar, cardamom in addition to the typical coffee exports) in the early sixties have 
contributed to the rise of a rural proletariat, comprising of a majority of indigenous 
people, as opposed to the traditional ladino (white Spanish-speaking population) middle 
class.21 The different armed insurgencies that emerged during this period were mainly a 
natural continuation of the popular unrests against the elected government that occurred 
at the end of the fifties and did not immediately appeal to native people. Nevertheless, the 
                                                
21 Paige, pp. 728-729. 
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rural base of these guerrilla movements would grow as the civil war progressed and as 
indigenous populations identified their interests with the Marxist rebels’ program. In 
order to properly understand the intensification of indigenous political mobilization, one 
has to view it as a parallel phenomenon to the increasing community activism of the 
highlands during the 1970s and the ideological debates occurring in several universities 
throughout the country.22 
My research seems to partially disprove Wickham-Crowley’s statement, 
according to which “peasants join guerrilla movements to pursue peasant interests, not 
due to ideological conversion.”23 It appears that, at least in the case of Guatemala, Indian 
peasants and migrant workers have usually joined the insurgency further to class-
consciousness, a concept that is supported by Konefal’s work, the unification of the four 
main guerrilla movements in 1982 under the general umbrella of the Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Army (URNG), and the 1996 Peace Accords with the 
Guatemalan Government.24  I will argue that such a long-term perspective is contrary to 
the stereotypical view of peasants interested only in their land and their temporary well 
being.  
Finally, the Peace Accords represented a fundamental step towards the 
advancement of the indigenous cause and are the lenses through which judging the 
effectiveness of Indians’ mobilization in Guatemala.  
The fifth chapter will examine another insurgency, the Shining Path of Peru, a 
Maoist guerrilla active from 1980 to the first half of the nineties (although it is believed 
                                                
22 Konefal, Ch. 3. 
23 Wickham-Crowley, Tymothy P. “The Rise (And Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin 
America,” in Sociological Forum, Vol. 2, 3 (Summer 1987): p. 494, available at http: 
//www.jstor.org/stable/684670, (accessed on 7 November 2010).  
24 Rizo Otero, pp. 122-127. 
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to still exist nowadays). After a short background on the political history of Peru, I will 
focus on the armed insurgency, perhaps the most violent terrorist group in Latin America, 
considering the relatively short time span in which it operated, having caused the death or 
the forced disappearance of 69,280 persons.25 The Shining Path was led by a strong and 
charismatic personality, Carlos Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, also known as President 
Gonzalo, who creatively mixed Maoist thought with the outstanding indigenous question 
of Peru, addressed previously by José Carlos Mariátegui, the founder of the Peruvian 
Communist Party. Considerable space will be allocated to the analysis of the Peruvian 
intellectual milieu of the twentieth century and on its great impact on Guzmán’s 
personality and personal beliefs,26 which ultimately shaped the actions of the terrorist 
group and largely determined its failure.  
As in Guatemala, Peru was a country that relied heavily on agrarian resources. 
The Shining Path tried to capitalize on the widespread discontent among the Indian 
population, usually peasants from the Andes or from rural areas deprived of their lands. 
However, the brutality of the movement, coupled with the extremely dogmatic ideology 
of its leader, prevented the Shining Path from gaining peasants’ support in the long run. 
This lack of representation among the peasantry, along with ideological rigidity, 
generated a myopic conception of the Peruvian society with little or no attention to the 
specificity of the indigenous populations. Ultimately, the Shining Path failed to 
understand that its uncompromising guerrilla warfare turned into pure terrorism proved to 
be deleterious not only to the Indians, but also to civil society as a whole. Peasants would 
                                                
25 Roncagliolo, p. 16. 
26 Aside from Roncagliolo’s biography, I will use interviews and speeches by Guzmán. 
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indeed rebel against the rebels in several occasions27 and organize rondas campesinas 
(peasant patrols) to defend their villages from forced recruitment into the movement. 
Although both the Guatemalan and Peruvian governments reacted brutally to armed 
revolution, often targeting indigenous populations as a punishment for their political 
activism, the will to negotiate displayed by the Guatemalan URNG was totally absent in 
the Shining Path. This further proves the extreme rigidity of the group and transforms the 
Peruvian internal conflict into a “zero sum game” where the winner is an absolute one 
and the ethnic element of the population is discarded in favor of ideology.  
The following chapter will be dedicated to a structured analysis and comparison 
between the two case studies: what worked and what failed to achieve results in both 
Guatemala and Peru’s armed groups and why. This part will critically assess the validity 
of my hypothesis against the performances of the URNG and the Shining Path, thus 
verifying the strength of my initial claim. Two variables will be measured, namely 
Marxist insurgencies’ degree of support for indigenous grievances and their degree of 
dogmatism. The ensuing conclusions will highlight that, on the one hand, the Guatemalan 
case showed a certain degree of reciprocity in the relationship between non-state armed 
groups and indios. Leftist insurgencies’ legitimacy was possible because their statement 
partially reflected the ethnic cleavages of the country. In turn, indigenous rights were 
inserted in the Government’s agenda for the first time as a result of the negotiations 
between the State and the armed groups. On the other hand, the case of Peru 
demonstrated that, in order to be successful, ideological insurgencies have to be mindful 
of the inherent characteristics of the targeted population and that class conflicts are not 
                                                
27 Starn, Orin.“Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of 
History,” in Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27, 2 (May 1995): p. 415, available at http: 
//www.jstor.org/stable/158120, (accessed on 7 November 2010).  
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sufficient to gain the support of indigenous people. Thus, I will argue that Marxist 
theories’ application in the Latin American region is limited, because it vitally depends 
on a flexibility that these frameworks do not possess per se. Without a clear link to 
ethnicity, armed insurgencies in this part of the world are not only bound to fail, but also 
to further broaden the divisions among the community. 
Taking into consideration the experiences of these two countries, my research will 
conclude in the seventh and last chapter by inferring a set of lessons learned and policy 
recommendations that could be applied to other countries equally challenged by armed 
groups whose claims are intertwined to the indigenous cause. Government officials and 
political analysts could use the past experiences of Guatemala and Peru to facilitate the 
reinsertion into society of former elements of Marxist insurgencies and to adequately 
factor indigenous rights in their countries’ legislations, so that multiculturalism can 
become a reality. Finally, I will identify three main areas of reform intended to promote a 
pluri-cultural concept of the state: education, land reform, and judiciary. Political stability 
and fair distribution of resources are direct consequences of such more balanced, yet 
complex, approach to state building.  
The concluding remarks of my research are aimed at showing that the lessons 
learned from the Guatemalan and Peruvian case could be valid beyond the Latin 
American region and do apply to all countries with a significant ethnic component and a 
high potential for conflict. 
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Chapter 2 – The Ethnic Question 
2.1 – Initial Remarks 
 The condition of oppression and discrimination that Latin American indigenous 
people have endured since colonialism is also defined as the “ethnic question.” 
Throughout the years, white elites have exploited American Indians economically, while 
dismissing their culture as backward and degenerate. This prolonged segregation did not 
end with independence from Spain, as native populations found themselves still at the 
bottom of the social ladder, with little or no involvement in the nation-building process 
that was taking place in the nineteenth century.  
 Within the Latin American territory, the implications of the ethnic question have 
been different and contingent upon the specific demographic of the Indian communities 
as a result of the Spanish conquest. However, a commonly shared feature of the Indian 
problem arose after independence. Governments of the sub-continent continued to ignore 
the indigenous element inherent in their national societies, as if the end of colonialism 
had suddenly stopped the century-long inequalities to which indios had been subjected. 
Such a tacit agreement among elites was even more ludicrous in Central American and 
central Andean countries, home to 85 percent of the entire Latin American indigenous 
population, estimated to reach 40 million.28 Here, national identity was forged to the 
detriment of ethnic differences that were at times downplayed and at times blamed for the 
countries’ failure to attain economic development. Thus, it was here that indigenous 
minorities have played (and will continue to) a major role in advancing ethnicity as a key 
component of any Latin American nation. 
                                                
28 Sieder, Rachel, ed. Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity, and Democracy. 
Palgrave McMillan: London (2002): p. 1.  
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2.2 – Ethnicity, “Mestizaje,” and “Indigenismo” 
 Race and ethnicity are sometimes used interchangeably. However, scholars like 
Yinger and Chambers caution against such an indiscriminate use of the two terms and 
define race as a mostly biological category and ethnicity as a social and cultural one.29 
More specifically, Yinger describes race as one of the “defining elements”30 of ethnicity, 
along with language or religion, and offers the following definition of an ethnic group: “a 
segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and/or others, to 
have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture.”31 
Although in the Latin American case the ethnic question could refer to several minority 
groups, such as Afro-American and Asian people, that have also been victimized and 
discriminated against, this research paper will only deal with indigenous people. This is 
why I will occasionally refer to the ethnic question as the “Indian question.”  
 With regard to the word indio, it is important to point out that its essence has 
changed throughout time, in a historically and socially constructed process. While during 
the colonial era this term was used mainly with a racial connotation, it then came to 
encompass ethnic notions of belonging to the same nation with a particular type of 
“indigenismo.” Lately, depending on the country, the term could be used in a positive 
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way to reinforce cultural identity or with a negative association that links it to the 
colonial past.32 
 Spanish conquistadores, and Columbus in primis, judged the indio through the 
Western categories they were comfortable with and immediately rejected him as different 
(otro). The well-known history of ruthless domination of the indigenous population 
during colonialism is not only a consequence of economic calculations, but stems also 
from racist ideologies, abetted by religious beliefs. Indians were considered inferior by 
means of their physical traits and because of their “idolatrous” habits.33 Conversion to the 
Catholic faith would not redeem them from the sin of not being white. Thus, colonial 
society was essentially divided into white elites and Indians and such a rigid social 
structure would not fundamentally change with the growth of a mestizo (mixed) 
population. Generally, given that indigenous people were subject to a tax to the Spanish 
crown as a compensation for the right to cultivate communal land, mestizos were 
incorporated in the indigenous ethnic category by the colonial administration. 
 Latin America’s fight for independence in the early nineteenth century did not 
terminate the oppression of indigenous peoples. To the contrary, the end of colonialism 
only worsened the condition of native populations, who at least under the Spanish 
government benefited from legal protection and local autonomy.34 The liberation 
movement that wavered around the sub-continent meant the creation of national states 
and the conquest of political power for Creole elites, but only brought more misery and 
subordination to the Indian masses that were excluded from this nation-making process. 
                                                
32 Ideas of semantic differences in the term indio across Latin America are taken from the Seminar of 
Carlos Camacho that I attended on 13 October 2010 at the United Nations Headquarters. 
33 Barabas, p. 11.  
34 Chambers, in Appelbaum et al., p. 34. 
  20 
Despite embracing liberal ideas of equality, supporters of independence continued to be 
victims of racial stereotypes that confined indios to the bases of the social pyramid, in 
light of their biological inferiority and lack of education. Simón Bolívar, the 
independence leader, considered the “difference between the races”35 of Latin America 
an impediment to democracy and real autonomy, while liberal Domingo F. Sarmiento 
boosted European immigration to Argentina, so as to balance the indigenous 
component.36 As governments consolidated their power, racial discrimination and 
economic exploitation of indigenous minorities increased, for the sake of national 
interest. The size of communal lands shrank inexorably as the state was confiscating 
more and more productive land to indigenous communities. In many countries, especially 
in Mesoamerica, native people were subject to peonage in order to fuel an economy 
dependent on exports. The rise of scientific racism during the nineteenth century 
contributed to the already existing dichotomy between whites and the “others” and 
further legitimized the hierarchical structure created by the upper strata of white and 
Creole population.37 This is the phase of political and ethnic assimilation, described by 
Rodríguez Guaján as a process “by which the dominant culture of a given society 
deprives of influence and eliminates, by direct and brutal means, the culture(s) of the 
other people(s) in the name of a single state.”38 In other words, because the indigenous 
element was seen as an obstacle to the young nation’s overall progress towards 
modernity, the assimilationist approach tried to eliminate it through “cultural 
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homogenization.”39 Where native populations were scarce, namely in Argentina or Chile, 
physical elimination constituted a more feasible approach for white elites in order to 
facilitate national unity and economic development.  
 According to the analysis of Appelbaum, Macpherson and Rosenblatt, the early 
twentieth century witnessed a changing attitude in Latin American upper classes, due to 
the mounting of a popular mobilization mainly represented by the Mexican Revolution of 
the 1910-20s and by the increasing peasant and worker unionism across the region.40 
Despite the lingering of racial concepts, the nation-making process became more 
inclusive for indigenous minorities, primarily because of the appearance of “mestizaje,” 
intended as the celebration of one Latin American identity as opposed to several sub-
identities revealed by race.41 In the vision of the most fervent proponent of “mestizaje,” 
Mexican José Vasconcelos, the mixture of all the races within the Latin American 
continent would give birth to a “cosmic race” capable of transcending biological notions 
in favor of the “spiritual fusion of people.”42 Though closer to a philosophical approach 
towards the ethnic problem rather than to a political one, “mestizaje” was used by Latin 
American intellectuals as an anti-imperialist tool to reassert their racial equality or 
superiority vis-à-vis the European and United States-sponsored racial purity.43 
 In Appelbaum et al., the origins of “mestizaje” coincide with the emergence of 
“indigenismo,” another “social and cultural movement”44 that was particularly active in 
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Mesoamerica and the Andean region. Many other scholars, such as Tamayo Herrera and 
Bollinger and Lund, distance themselves from this position and conceive “indigenismo” 
as the natural Indian response to the ethnic question, an attitude that can be traced back to 
the colonialist days and the first indigenous rebellions and whose objectives and actors 
had changed throughout the years.45 Generally, indigenistas’ focus was placed on the 
indigenous component of Latin American societies rather than on celebrating an ideal 
mixed race. To be sure, “indigenismo” was consistent with a regional response to 
Western ideas that assumed white people’s intrinsic superiority at both the physical and 
the cultural level. In this sense, the chronological classification of Appelbaum et al. 
acquires a greater meaning, also taking into account that “indigenismo” as an intellectual 
current triumphed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
 Against the backdrop of the complex and fluid situation of the newly independent 
Latin American states, “indigenismo” had various strands that could be commonly 
grouped as “bourgeois indigenismo,” “radical indigenismo” and “Marxist indigenismo.”46 
The first approach was repeatedly used by states with a consistent indigenous minority in 
order to incorporate native people into the elites’ nation-making programs. Also called 
“officialist indigenismo,”47 such a movement idealized the Indian past pursuing a two-
fold objective: the integration of the indio into the new nation-state and the partial 
address of the ethnic problem, which at that stage could no longer be ignored. 
Unfortunately, its pragmatic approach that celebrated unity over racial difference 
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thwarted the elaboration of government policies genuinely interested at solving 
indigenous minorities’ problems. This type of “indigenismo” was more directed at 
assuaging Indian populations’ grievances by strategically praising their cultural aspects, 
which were reduced to mere “folklore.” Integrationist approaches48 can for instance be 
found during the Guatemalan civil conflict, when levels of violence against the Mayan 
population skyrocketed and yet government’s officials continued to pay tributes to the 
“Indianness” of the country in public ceremonies.49  
 “Radical indigenismo” also bore an element of opportunism. Advanced by 
intellectuals that were either isolated in the provincial milieu or were disappointed at the 
mainstream intellectual discourse, it found refuge in the cultures of pre-Hispanic 
indigenous civilizations, whose main elements had by then disappeared. These 
intellectuals were quick in exploiting Inca or Mayan traditions to advance their political 
agendas: Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, founder of the Peruvian party American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA),50 and Abimael Guzmán, leader of the Shining Path, are 
fitting example of this strand. 
 The apogee of the “Marxist indigenismo,” also called “socialist indigenismo” in 
Peru,51 was during the First Latin American Communist Conference in 1929, where the 
Peruvian delegation drew upon the work of the intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui to 
reflect on the Indian question in the sub-continent.52 Mariátegui plainly rejected 
conceiving of the Indian problem in an ethnic way, as he saw in such an approach 
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remnants of “imperialist ideas.”53 Instead, he located the roots of the outstanding issue in 
the “land tenure system,”54 thus prioritizing the economic and social aspect over the 
cultural and racial one. In line with these reflections, subsequent strands of “Marxist 
indigenismo” in Guatemala, also known as “clasistas,” would interpret the ethnic 
question as a fight of social classes and would refuse classic “indigenista” approaches 
more interested in defending the specific traits of the Mayan culture.55  
 A general critique of “mestizaje” and “indigenismo” argues that both movements 
were usually distant from indigenous masses, as they were the product of intellectuals 
who lacked representation among the Indians mainly because they belonged to the white 
or mestizo classes. In addition, as contended by de la Cadena, these intellectual debates 
were not alien to a certain level of racism, due to the fact that the subjects of their 
discussion, mestizos and indios, respectively, were still conceptualized in racial terms, 
despite the movement’s attempted rebellion against Western racial models. The sobering 
conclusion is that, whether expressed in a cultural trend or through a government policy, 
the ethnic question failed to be addressed for centuries.  
2.3 – The Indigenous Rights Front 
 It is only in the last two decades of the twentieth century that native populations 
began a systematic mobilization that transcended the national borders and acquired the 
form of an indigenous global movement. Stavenhagen offers a multiple explanation to the 
sudden change in the ethnic question debate from a mainly theoretical one to a more 
realistic and inclusive one. Firstly, he ascribed to the end of the Cold War a strategic 
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importance for the shift of the discussion towards indigenous people: as we will see in the 
Guatemalan and Peruvian cases, Marxist frameworks that tried to recruit Indians lost 
their appeal with the worldwide defeat of Communism. Moreover, the growing influence 
of the global economy over previously isolated indigenous communities triggered a clash 
between the latter and state economic policies, which in turn fostered indigenous unity. 
Finally, the so-called “third wave of democratization”56 that appeared in Latin America in 
the early 1980s granted indigenous people the political participation they had always 
been deprived of under the authoritarian and military governments that thrived since the 
independence from Spain.57 
 Arguably, the main success of this global indigenous movement was in the legal 
sphere. On the one hand, the emergence of a dialogue between the Indian and the state is 
recognized nationally and represented by the blossoming of constitutional reforms 
adopted by countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala in the 1980s and 
1990s.58 While the Bolivian Constitution of 1994 defines the country as “multiethnic, 
multicultural and multilingual,”59 the Brazilian Constitution deals with indigenous people 
in a whole separate chapter.60 Article 66 of the Guatemalan 1985 Constitution recognizes 
the existence of ethnic groups and declares that the state “respects, and promotes their 
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lifeways, customs, traditions, forms of social organization, the use of indigenous clothing 
of men and women, and languages and dialects.”61 
 On the other hand, the improvement of the legal condition of the indio has been 
formalized at the international level with the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989), 
signed and ratified by 14 out of the 20 Latin American countries, including Guatemala 
and Peru.62 Convention 169, as it is most commonly known, represented a milestone in 
the path towards the full recognition of native people’s rights, especially because it 
encouraged states with considerable indigenous minorities to abandon their 
“assimilationist” approach and to embrace diversity as a catalyst for development.63 With 
regard to the Indian question, the ILO Convention is equally important, as it encompasses 
the broad range of elements that constituted the problem, from the ethnic to the social, 
cultural, economic, and political aspect. It does, in fact, propose a definition of 
indigenous people as groups “in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous 
on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country…at the 
time of conquest or colonisation …and who …retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions.”64 Presenting self-identification as the main 
basis of identification for indigenous people,65 the Convention breaks with the racial and 
ethnic paradigms of the past and inaugurates an era of true pluralism. It further calls on 
governments to safeguard the full spectrum of rights of native people (Article 2) and to 
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end discrimination towards them (Article 3). At the political level, the Convention 
advocates for the inclusion of indigenous people in all “administrative and legislative 
measures which may affect them directly”66 and extends this consultation process to 
national and regional decisions that may have an impact on their communities (Article 7). 
Finally, at the economic level, this binding document dedicates an entire part to the 
access to land, seen as a spiritual bondage and as a right to subsistence, in line with 
Marxist and “indigenistas” views. In Article 14, the Convention notes the importance of 
“the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the land which 
they traditionally occupy”67 and subsequently mandates the protection of indigenous 
populations’ rights to the “natural resources pertaining to their lands.”68 
 The indigenous rights regime was further expanded with the increasing activity of 
the international community in the following years. The United Nations created the 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues as a body directly reporting to the Economic and 
Social Council in 2000, 69 while it had previously declared the “International Decade of 
the World’s Indigenous People” in 1995, followed by the second one in 2005.70 Four 
years ago, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, which significantly reiterates all the rights enshrined in the ILO 
Convention, but makes a fundamental original contribution, namely the right to self-
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determination.71 Such a right, absent in previous international law documents, had been a 
missing element in the context of an indigenous rights regime. Many indigenous rights 
proponents were, in fact, convinced of the utmost importance of regional and local 
autonomy for native communities to adequately participate in the nation-making 
process.72 However, the non-binding nature of the Declaration diminishes the value of 
such a revolutionary step. Likewise, one must acknowledge that there is a gap between 
the internationally recognized provisions on indigenous rights and national legislation. 
Even in the case of the legally binding ILO Convention, Latin American states have been 
found generally lacking the political will and the economic and institutional resources to 
implement these rights. Their constitutional amendments discussed above are also widely 
neglected.  
 The growth of international attention to the claims of indigenous minorities has 
spawned a revival of native people’s rights also at the regional level. The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has created a Working Group to foster a consensus for the 
issuance of an American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People.73 This and 
other measures, notwithstanding their “soft power,” are indeed the symbol of a process 
for raising awareness that will unlikely stop. By advancing a multicultural and “pluralist 
approach,”74 the growing regime on indigenous rights is acting as a norm-changing agent 
and has once more demonstrated the resilience of native populations, particularly in the 
Latin American region. 
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Chapter 3 – Marxist Thought and Marxism in Latin America 
3.1 – Marxism and Marxist frameworks 
 When Antonio Gramsci said “Marx signifies the entry of intelligence into the 
history of humanity,”75 he summarized in those few words the enormous impact of 
Marxist ideas in all subsequent economic, political, and philosophical thought. After 
settling in most of the Western capitalist world during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, Karl Marx’ theories have spread beyond Europe, influencing not only 
scholars and politicians, but also disenfranchised sectors of the world population. With its 
emphasis on the importance of class-consciousness, Marxist thought has acted as a tool of 
awareness for millions of people in the so-called Third World. In the post-colonialist era, 
ideals of socialist revolution and classless society were particularly powerful in the Latin 
American region, where Cuba stood as an example of a successful communist State. 
 Yet, classical Marxism and Marxist approaches are two separate things. While the 
former derives from the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the latter is an 
interpretation of these two scholars’ ideas and comprises of numerous strains of thought, 
from Leninism and Stalinism in Russia to Maoism in China and “Cheguevarism” in Latin 
America. Although the common underpinning of these approaches is a belief in 
communism as a necessary phase to overcome capitalism, they are all different re-
elaborations of main tenets of classic Marxism and, as such, cannot be plainly identified 
with it. Rather, one can argue that, after Marx, Marxist frameworks could be regarded as 
a “method of investigation” as opposed to an “all-embracing theory of history.” 76 This 
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approach best explains the distinct features that Marxism has assumed in different 
countries at different times in history and helps us understand why Marxist guerrilla 
movements have had unequal outcomes even within the same continent. 
3.2 – Classical Marxism 
 Before analyzing the specifics of Marxist ideology in Latin America, it is useful 
to examine some of the main assumptions introduced by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
as they constitute the theoretical foundation of following proponents of communism.  
 Socialism in the first half of the nineteenth century was a well-known concept that 
could be traced back to Plato or Thomas Moore and that was advanced by intellectuals 
such as Babeuf or Saint-Simon.77 However, Marxist socialism differs from these thinkers 
in its fundamental premise. Instead of assuming a normative approach by considering 
poverty, brought by the Industrial Revolution and the increasing accumulation of capital, 
as the leading cause of change for the worker class, the starting point of Marxist analysis 
is dehumanization.78 In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx 
identified the alienation of human labor, in turn caused by extreme technological 
development, as the chief problematic brought about by advanced capitalism. When 
mental and physical work are disconnected and man’s own labor starts to be 
commercialized as a “thing,” the dehumanization process is complete and can only be 
fought through man’s awareness of such situation. Because it was the most oppressed and 
dehumanized social class, Marx believed that the proletariat was going to be entrusted 
with setting humanity free through social upheaval and the establishment of communism. 
This is the phase of history that, due to the abolition of private property and the division 
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of labor, will finally put an end to human alienation and will usher in the harmonious 
stage of socialism, with its classless society.79 
 In subsequent works, Marx refined his theory of communism by focusing on 
several issues. One cardinal concept in his thought is the “mode of production” which 
“determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.”80 
Capitalism is the mode of production of the modern world, having gradually displaced 
feudalism, and one of its main advantages, according to Marx, is the fact of having 
contributed to the material well being of Western European nations. A unanimously 
recognized merit of Marxist analysis is its lucid view of capitalism and its flaws: this 
mode of production is, in fact, presented as containing paradoxes that will eventually lead 
to its destruction. The central contradiction, or “falling rate of profit,” posits that 
advancing technology and industrialization, aiming at maximizing production and thus 
substituting workers with machines, will eventually hinder capitalists’ profits, due to 
unemployment and decreasing wages of producers/consumers.81  
 Within the capitalist system, three elements coexist: market exchanges, the 
dominance of the bourgeoisie as the main owner of capital, and the subordination of the 
working class, who is the producer of capital.82 That is why Marx and Engels 
conceptualize the modern capitalist system in a perpetual conflict between dominant class 
(bourgeoisie) and exploited class (proletariat), while they maintain, in one of their most 
often quoted phrases, that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
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class struggle.”83 Linked to this position is their materialist approach to history, also 
known as “historical materialism,” that privileges economic aspects and changes in the 
modes of production as the main causes of historical events and that derives from Marx’ 
conception of the world as made of a “substructure” and a “superstructure.” The first is 
described as the sum of the “relations of production” in which men enter during their 
“social production,”84 whereas the second comprehends all other aspects of human life, 
from political institutions to religious and cultural beliefs.85  
 It is especially around the interpretation of historical materialism that subsequent 
Marxist frameworks diverge. According to certain scholars, like Kolakowski, Marx 
himself did not believe that all historical phenomena could be explained by referring to 
economic and class factors alone, as this would make his whole theory “unsustainable.”86 
Kolakowski, in fact, is not in favor of a literal and dogmatic reading of Marx’ work, as he 
cautions against the “radical and unacceptable formulas”87 that the intellectual frequently 
used in his work in order to advance his revolutionary hypotheses. Interpreted more 
strictly, though, Marxism can lead to a reductionist and determinist view of history, one 
that relies only on class fight and economic interests and is blind to any other element of 
man’s existence.  
 
                                                
83 Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. The Communist Manifesto. The Electric Book Co.: London (1998): p. 
8. 
84 Marx, A contribution to the critique of Political Economy, p. 11. 
85 Kolakowski, p. 277. 
86 Ibid., p. 302.  
87 Ibid., p. 303. In Aditya Nigam, one of the reasons for the reductionist interpretations of Marx is his 
“canonization,” that has destroyed the “critical spirit” of the philosopher in favor of a more plain and easier 
understanding of his works. Underlining Marx’ self-criticism and cyclical re-thinking of his previous 
writings, Nigam concludes that any interpretations of the philosopher’s theory has to be mindful of this in 
order to be comprehensive and realistic. (Nigam, Aditya. “Marxism and the Postcolonial World: Footnotes 
to a Long March,” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 34, 1/2, Jan. 1999: 33-43, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4407547, accessed on 9 April 2011). 
  33 
3.3 – Marxism after Marx: Russia and China 
 Following Marx and Engels’ deaths (1883 and 1895, respectively),88 their 
socialist ideas were deeply rooted in the political consciousness of the European 
intelligentsia. At the end of the nineteenth century, the debate on European Marxism was 
focused on two main concepts: the organization of the socialist party and its path to 
achieving revolution. In the context of Russia’s backwardness and semi-feudal society, 
Lenin emerged as a prominent figure in the country’s young and still illegal socialist 
movement. His greatest contribution to Marxist thought lay in his “practical” 
implementation of it, as opposed to the mere theorization found in Marx and Engels.89 He 
argued for centralism as the only way to victory for Russian socialism, because of 
Russia’s inherently different structural conditions as compared to Europe. Taking into 
account the extremely weak proletariat class, and the tsarist regime, Lenin maintained 
that only through a trained and limited group of “professional revolutionaries” could the 
Russian Social Democracy find the optimal organization to defeat oppression and bring 
revolution on a large scale.90 This rigid centralization of the Russian communist party 
woulb be a lasting feature, even after the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and it would 
distinguish the tenure of Lenin’s successor, Stalin (1924-1953). With him, Russia 
abandoned the Trotskyan concept of “global revolution” to adopt the dictator’s idea of 
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“Socialism in One Country,” by which the Soviet regime decided to continue on the 
socialist path despite the defeat of leftist parties in Europe.91 
 Marxism in China, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, relied heavily on the 
power of the masses, mainly peasants. Mao’s original re-elaboration of Marxism-
Leninism consisted, in fact, in the belief that “social strata were revolutionary in 
proportion to their poverty”92 and in taking advantage of this potential for revolution by 
focusing on the countryside instead of the urban centers. After his victory against the 
Kuomintang in 1949, Mao instituted a communist regime following the footsteps of 
Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution, but then departed from his Russian counterparts, 
mainly on how to achieve economic development. While Russian communism 
emphasized the importance of scientific knowledge in attaining industrialization, Maoism 
seemed to stress more the power of the masses elicited through ideological pressure and 
distrusted intellectual knowledge, which could cause “moral degeneration.”93  
 Maoist thought greatly differed from classic Marxism and Leninism in that it did 
not conceive of communism as a peaceful and harmonious phase, but as a conflictive 
status. This theory of “permanent revolution” stemmed from Mao’s assumption that a 
classless society and social harmony were both impossible to achieve because, whenever 
a phase of equilibrium was reached, one class would always try to prevail over the 
others.94  
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 Russian and Chinese versions of Marxism expanded their hegemony to Third 
World countries during the second half of the twentieth century, even when communist 
ideas started to “relax” or were abandoned as a consequence of the end of the Cold War.  
3.4 – Marxism in Latin America 
 Within Latin America, one can distinguish two co-existing and mutually 
influencing strands of Marxist thought: a “revolutionary” and an “economic” one. With 
regard to the “revolutionary” strand, Marxism-Leninism exercised the greatest influence 
on the sub-continent, especially during the first half of the nineteenth century, the acme 
of the Soviet Union totalitarian regime. The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and dependency theory constitute the 
theoretical underpinning of the second line of thought, which is more focused on 
development rather than on socialist revolution. 
 The revolutionary potential of poor rural and urban masses foreseen by Leninism 
and, subsequently, Maoism had an inevitable appeal throughout Latin America, where the 
agrarian question originated with colonialism continued to represent an obstacle to social 
justice. With the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Marxist Leninist model consolidated in 
the area but was soon modified in light of the region’s specific conditions. Molded into 
the Soviet centralized and extremely bureaucratized party, the Cuban regime and other 
Latin American communist parties, such as the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran, would later 
opt for an official party led by intellectuals (the Leninist “vanguard”) linked to mass 
organizations and armed guerrillas. This combination of unions, popular activism, and 
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armed wings would form the party’s natural bond to the society, which was virtually 
absent in the rigid Soviet system.95 
 As the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict deepens in the 1960s, communist parties 
in Latin America align themselves with either approach and revolutionary groups 
underwent fervent discussions on ideological orthodoxy, which brought about several 
defections. Peru was perhaps one of the most interesting examples of such ideological 
debates that eventually led to the establishment of a myriad of sub-groups within the 
main communist party. After siding with the Chinese interpretation of Marxism, the 
Shining Path became the most notorious of these communist factions. Mao’s focus on the 
peasantry and his theory of revolution coming from the countryside attracted Peruvian 
intellectuals, given the country’s agrarian question and the vast number of impoverished 
peasants that could potentially overthrow the bourgeois and semi-capitalist regime.  
 Elsewhere, notably in Guatemala, Marxist frameworks were more sensitive to 
ethnicity and native populations. Here, Marxism was used as a political tool to involve 
native masses into the revolutionary struggle against capitalism, but with a view to 
preserving their cultural and ethnic characteristics.96 Still led by intellectuals, this fight 
against the bourgeois class was seen as a more complex one than its European equivalent. 
The dichotomy between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie identified by Marx and Engels 
in their Communist Manifesto was in the Latin American case a tension between several 
classes, comprising of peasants, urbanized workers, landowners, and a few members of 
the industrial bourgeoisie. The specific stage of Latin American capitalism, not yet fully 
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developed, as well as the presence of a conspicuous number of native populations, had to 
be taken into account for a successful path to social revolution.  
 Economic theories based on Marxist frameworks were concerned about the late 
development of Latin America in the context of a globalized capitalist market. Jorge 
Larrain identifies three stages of capitalism and connects them to the emergence of 
different theories of development.97 The first phase, the “age of competitive capitalism” 
(1700-1860)98 is what Marx considered the establishment of the bourgeoisie as the main 
social class, after the demise of feudalism. Colonialism played a key role, in that it 
provided new markets for the bourgeoisie’s capital expansion.99 In the “age of 
imperialism” (1860-1945), the world economy witnessed the concentration of capital into 
monopolistic systems and the introduction of the theory of imperialism, thanks to 
intellectuals like Lenin, Hobson, Luxembourg, and Bukharin. Imperialism was seen as 
the most evolved expression of capitalism, a phase where the merging of industrial and 
financial capital triggered the will of expansion of capitalist countries to non-capitalist 
economies. While the colonization of new markets was regarded as a positive 
consequence for “backward” countries because it offered them the structural conditions 
to develop, it was nonetheless perceived as a cumbersome responsibility for central 
economies, which risked collapsing.100 With the end of the Second World War, Larrain 
distinguishes a new phase of “late capitalism,” during which this mode of production 
underwent a period of expansion (until 1966) and of subsequent decadence (from 1966 
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until 1980s).101 The first two decades saw the proliferation of theories of modernization, 
according to which pre-capitalist and non-democratic countries had to experience the 
same stages of development of Western countries in order to reach economic and 
political maturity. Widely criticized for their teleological approach only focused on 
Western models, these frameworks are gradually substituted for more domestic and 
homegrown approaches. In Latin America, the ideas developed within the United 
Nations-sponsored ECLAC represented a chief contribution to this debate. The fruit of a 
complex economic reasoning that viewed Third World countries as a periphery in 
opposition to core (Western) countries, ECLAC’s analysis of the Latin America situation 
was built within the context of capitalism as the sole means of development and in this it 
strongly differed from Marxist perspectives. It proposed a process of industrialization that 
was brought about in an autarchic way, so as to obviate the economic exploitation of the 
global market. Abetted by a strong state intervention and protectionist tariffs, this 
“import-substituting industrialization” (ISI) would eliminate the reliance on foreign 
imports and, consequently, economic dependency.102 
 When, in the second half of 1900, capitalism reached stagnation and it seemed 
clear that the ISI model advocated by ECLAC had failed to stimulate economic 
development and was no longer sustainable, Latin American scholars elaborated a new 
set of concepts, broadly encompassed by the so-called “development theory.” Their main 
purpose was to study capitalism in peripheral countries and they have been credited with 
advocating an analysis of the development of capitalist structures in the Latin American 
region that took into account the sub-continent’s “peculiar historical and geographical 
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circumstances.”103 Specifically, in Faletto and Cardoso’s version, dependency theory 
explained the failed or delayed industrialization of the region not only through its 
unfavorable position in the global market and vis-à-vis central economies, but also and 
mainly by considering Latin America’s internal political processes. In a traditional 
Marxist approach, patterns of class struggles were considered the catalyst of all historical 
processes and dependency was not seen as an inevitable outcome for Latin America, 
because it could be overcome with the help of internal economic strategies.104 Other 
proponents of dependency theory (Furtado, Sunkel, and Pinto)105 were more pessimistic 
and did not foresee the possibility of real development in the periphery of the world-
system. Instead, they blamed industrialization for the “development of 
underdevelopment”106 in Third World countries. 
 Overall, it is clear how different strands of Marxism have greatly influenced Latin 
American politics in the twentieth century. Although their success has consistently 
diminished after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, these 
frameworks do continue to carry a certain weight on local policies, against the backdrop 
of persisting financial and economic dominance of countries such as the United States. 
However, I argue that Marxist theories will survive, here and elsewhere, so long as they 
are capable of cogently analyzing the realities of the region and to appreciate and 
pragmatically use national characteristics, both in the political and in the economic 
sphere. In the case of Latin America, ethnicity is a decisive factor in the success of these 
frameworks, as will be shown in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 – The Case of Guatemala 
4.1 – General Considerations 
 Guatemala is a land of contradictions, a country that typifies the Central 
American region in several ways. Deep-rooted racism, a consequence of this country’s 
colonial past, is continuing to affect social and political relationships within the strata of 
the Guatemalan population. Furthermore, the State has perpetuated inequality by 
systematically failing to mediate among the opposing interests of its citizens and by 
always taking the side of the elites and most powerful constituencies. It is fair to say that, 
since the 1821 Independence from Spain, the State has been the worst oppressor of the 
majority of Guatemalans, those excluded from economic progress and estranged from 
political participation. Among such groups of people left behind by a government 
completely indifferent to social reforms were indigenous people and poor ladinos, usually 
peasants, urbanized, or migrant workers. Finally, the militarization of politics from the 
early 1960s to the regime of General Lucas García, has sparked an unimaginable level of 
violence and repression whose intensity, in my opinion, is yet to be clarified.  
 Guatemalan society is still coping with the consequences of one of the longest 
civil wars ever known and the fact that indigenous populations were arguably the most 
targeted by the counterrevolutionary army greatly deepened the distance between them 
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4.2 – Historical Background 
 Right after independence, Guatemala was led by a series of Liberal governments. 
They focused on economic development and imposed a heavy system of taxation that, by 
targeting land and crops, ended up impoverishing Indian and ladino peasants,107  
 Despite Rafael Carrera’s revolt in 1838, Liberals were able to secure power once 
again after his death in 1865.108 In particular, modernization of the army and the 
bureaucracy, as well as the cultivation of coffee, received a huge boost during Justo 
Rufino Barrios’ tenure (1873-1885).109 The introduction of this new crop completely 
changed both Guatemala’s economy and land structure: while the former became 
completely dependent on coffee, reaching the astonishing figure of 85 percent of the 
country’s total exports by 1900,110 land distribution turned into the major cause of 
inequality within Guatemalan society. For the sake of economic progress, communal land 
in Indian villages was confiscated and sold. These expropriations forced peasants to live 
off of an ever-shrinking size of land, the so-called minifundio, and to seasonally migrate 
to coffee plantations in order to survive.111  
 In the context of this semi-colonial economy, Guatemala reacted to the decline of 
the coffee empire with the launch of a new crop with a better market. The twentieth 
century ushered in the banana economy, with capital pouring in from the United States112 
and multinational corporations that would greatly influence the Central American 
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country’s politics until the counterrevolution of 1954. The banana empire, just like the 
coffee one, considerably exacerbated the unequal land distribution of Guatemala while 
increasing the number of semi-wagers obliged to migrate to the unhealthy plantations on 
a regular basis.  
  The 1929 Great Depression tragically showed to the poor masses and the wealthy 
landowners alike the flaws of an economy fully dedicated to the export of commodities. 
General Jorge Ubico Casteñada’s efforts to diversify the crops by intensifying rice and 
corn cultivation113 only partially addressed the country’s foreign debt. Meanwhile, 
peasants’ conditions continued to worsen as the State was expanding its control to the 
highlands to desperately exploit all possible resources.  
 It is against this backdrop that students, together with small businessmen and 
some army officers, initiated a period also known as the “Ten Years of Spring (1944-
1954).”114 When Juan José Arévalo Bermejo was elected as the new President, he tried to 
modernize Guatemala and to transform its semi-colonial economy into a capitalist one. 
To this end, he promoted public health and education115 and, through the 1945 
Constitution, abolished the system of forced labor and peonage116 that had so far 
characterized relations between peasants and landowners. His successor, Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzmán, brought reforms even farther, by approving and implementing the 1952 
Agrarian Reform Law, in an effort to address the primary cause of poverty and economic 
backwardness. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the Arbenz government was not 
so concerned about inequality and discrimination against indigenous populations and 
                                                
113 Ibid., p. 94. 
114 Ibid., p. 103. 
115 Booth et al., p. 116. 
116 Porras Castejón, p. 119. 
  43 
peasants in general. The agrarian reform was conceived more as a tool of modernization, 
a system that would make land cultivation more efficient and productive, hence 
benefiting the economy as a whole.117 The conservative aspects of the reform 
notwithstanding, one has to acknowledge that its pace was certainly unusually fast and its 
implementation a far-reaching one. In fact, figures show that peasants who directly 
profited from the land redistribution were 100,000118 (3.3 percent of a total population of 
about three million at the time), while the total acres of expropriated land by June 1954 
were 917,659.119 
 According to Gustavo Porras, several elements interacted to suddenly halt the 
democratic reforms of the spring decade: the opposition of the Church, the radicalism of 
society, the United States multinational corporations’ interests, coupled with an 
international scenario that feared Communism as the worst of evils.120 On the one hand, 
internal factors, such as a conservative clergy and a constant inability to duly take into 
account the structural constraints to a social revolution frustrated the Ten Years of Spring 
path to democracy. On the other hand, the end of the spring decade came in the form of 
an armed intervention orchestrated by the United States, arguably to protect its economic 
profits in Guatemala, threatened by the Arbenz’ land reform. At a closer analysis, though, 
the US-led coup seems more dictated by a broader political strategy rather than by 
economic concerns. The Communist Party of Guatemala (PCG) had formed in 1950 and 
was subsequently reorganized under the Guatemalan Workers’ Party (PGT) two years 
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later,121 while unionism and peasants organizations had already resumed under the 
Arévalo government.122 During the latter and Arbenz’ democratic administration, the 
United States had looked at this activism in an unfavorable way. However, the Agrarian 
Reform triggered the American intervention in virtue of the political and social 
consequences that it entailed. Arbenz and his clique were perceived as a communist 
menace not only for the United States, but also for the whole Central American region, 
where Guatemala held such a strategic and important position for the stability of the sub-
continent.  
 The CIA-backed coup of 1954 overthrew Arbenz and inaugurated a succession of 
military governments during which the Guatemalan society slipped back into extreme 
misery, polarization, and inequality. The land distribution carried out under the Agrarian 
Reform was quickly reverted, so that the old system of mini-latifundia was re-established, 
to the detriment of poor peasants and small landowners, who soon became landless once 
again. The semi-proletarization of the lower strata of society was a logical consequence 
of the severely unequal distribution of the land. According to figures of the Commission 
for Historical Clarification, ten years after the coup, 62 percent of Guatemalan land was 
in the hand of only 2.1 percent of the population, while 87 percent of peasants were 
cultivating plots of land that were too small to grant them an adequate level of 
subsistence.123 Furthermore, the military governments of this period were notoriously 
famous for their corruption, a general absence of fair and free elections, and their 
absolute and inconsiderate violence towards the opposition. Even during the civilian 
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government of Julio César Méndez Montenegro (1966-1970), the military continued to be 
the main player and to influence all decisions pertaining to the State administration. 
Méndez was completely unable to control the widespread violence between the first 
Marxist guerrilla movements that appeared in the early 1960s and the 
counterrevolutionary death squads, such as the “Mano Blanca,” that began their 
murderous operations under his tenure.124 
 Both the elections of 1970 and 1974 reflected an absolute lack of respect for the 
democratic process, with blatant fraud being routinely carried out and a level of violence 
that further escalated with the election of General Romeo Lucas García in 1978. During 
his regime (1978-1982), trade unions were crushed, universities repeatedly attacked, and 
activists and members of the opposition murdered or “disappeared.”125 The Commission 
for Historical Clarification established that the highest levels of violence perpetrated by 
the State against Guatemalans reached a peak during the years from 1981 to 1983,126  
between the government of Lucas García and its successor’s, General Efraín Ríos Montt. 
 Further to the 1985 elections, the deeply divided military agreed to a civilian 
transitional government and to a certain degree of democratic changes.127 The return to 
civilian institutions somehow bridged the cleavages of a society that had been torn apart 
by years of civil conflicts, State violence, and racial discrimination of the indigenous 
component. It certainly contributed to a historic shift of alliances within the Guatemalan 
society that led to a progressive legalization of left-wing activism and to its inclusion into 
the political game. Presidents Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo (1985-1990) and Jorge Serrano 
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Elias (1991-1993) are credited with initiating the long process that would then lead to the 
Peace Accords of 1996,128 arguably a memorable moment in the history of Guatemala.  
4.3 – Armed Guerrillas, State Repression, and Peace Accords 
 As hypothesized by many scholars, such as May129 and Handy,130 the 
militarization of the State and the concept of permanent counterrevolution was a chief 
factor in the appearance of armed insurgencies. The 1954 golpe featured an American 
intervention that was two-fold: while the United States facilitated the coup logistically 
and financially, it also introduced an anti-Communist Cold War ideology that would be 
espoused by the Guatemalan military and consistent segments of the populace for 
decades.  
 The establishment of a National Security Doctrine (Doctrina de Seguridad 
Nacional or DSN) elaborated within the American government,131 guaranteed the 
Guatemalan armed force a margin of action that was virtually unlimited. The cornerstone 
of the Doctrine was the belief that national power was constituted by four elements, 
namely an economic, political, social, and military aspect.132 However, due to the 
Communist threat, the resources of the first three components had to be channeled into 
military power, the greatest defender of national security. Against a background of 
absolute repression and intolerance for any form of opposition, Guatemalan society was 
at a crossroad: political choices were limited to either agree with the militarized 
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government or to silently dissent. All other types of activity would have to be carried out 
in a clandestine way.  
  The first armed insurgency stemmed from a group of disaffected military officers 
protesting against United States’ intervention into Guatemalan politics and demanding a 
restoration of the armed force.133 This guerrilla movement, named the November 13th 
Revolutionary Movement (MR-13), allied itself with the Guatemalan Communist Party 
after an unsuccessful golpe on 13 November 1960, creating the Rebel Armed Forces 
(Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes or FAR).134 An overwhelming counterrevolutionary strategy 
coupled with the fake restoration of civilian power in 1966, led to the defeat of this first 
wave of revolutionary groups.  
 An overall assessment of armed guerrillas of the 1960s cannot ignore their 
exclusive character, which kept them apart from the masses of peasants and poor 
Guatemalans. This State opposition was made of army officials and young middle-class 
ladinos who generally neglected the ethnic question in favor of a simple return to legality 
and democracy. Only after being decimated by the counterinsurgency did the guerrilla 
movements realize the importance of rural support and re-organized under a more 
complex and heterogeneous framework. This process began in the University of San 
Carlos of Guatemala in the form of an intellectual discourse over the problems of 
“poverty, discrimination, and political exclusion”135 and continued with a community-
based indigenous activism, ranging from Catholic groups and associations to unionism 
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and popular movements, such as the Committee for Peasants Unity (CUC), born after the 
earthquake that devastated the country in 1976.136 
 The indigenous activism of the 1970s is often linked to a structural change in the 
modes of production of indigenous villages, brought about by the economic boom of the 
1960s. Crop diversification and modernization of agriculture reached the isolated Maya 
municipios, while the individual plots of land were converted into modern cooperatives 
functioning as “autonomous local entities.”137 The phenomenon of society stratification, 
until then absent in indigenous communities, diversified relations among peasants and 
subverted the centenary structure of villages.  
 It could be argued that such a change greatly favored the introduction of the 
Marxist concepts of class contrapositions, enhancing the resonance of left-wing armed 
groups within Mayan communities.138 However, in my view, indigenous mobilization 
cannot be over-simplified and must be explained by a multitude of factors. Certainly, the 
economic considerations presented by Arias139 have played a very important role in a 
further polarization of society and in the rise of inequality after the 1973 economic crisis 
and the 1976 earthquake. Indians and poor ladinos, relying entirely on a commodity-
exporting economy, were the worst hit by the unfavorable international conjuncture of 
the 1970s and went back to extreme misery, landlessness, and low wages. But a complete 
and objective analysis has to factor in two other elements: State-sponsored violence and 
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armed guerrillas’ partial support for the indigenous cause starting from the second half of 
the 1970s.  
 Both Konefal and Porras consider the massacre of about fifty Mayans that took 
place in the Panzós square (Alta Verapaz department) in 1978 as the breaking point of 
indigenous tolerance towards State’s repression.140 At that stage, it was clear to Mayan 
communities that the government had declared a war against their minority. The 
discrimination and racism that had so far been preached in a subtle and paternalistic way 
were now showing their real faces of brutality, to which indigenous people responded 
with armed opposition. Moreover, the guerrilla groups that resurfaced in the 1970s were 
undoubtedly more attentive to Indians’ concerns, such as identity, culture, and 
exploitation and were able to attract a growing number of peasants by showing empathy 
and fostering unity across a wide range of combatants.  
 It is difficult to establish the real intentions behind the rebels’ accommodating 
shift towards the indigenous cause. While many Indians complained of continuing 
discrimination under the guerillas’ cadres,141 Porras’ description of his clandestine 
militancy conveys a sense of patriotism that, despite being at times too idealistic, does 
offer a credible picture of indigenous people fighting alongside with ladinos in a fraternal 
way. 
 The two main armed groups that, together with the FAR and the PGT, fought 
against the Guatemalan state from the early 1970s until the signing of the Peace Accords, 
were the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres or EGP) and the 
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Revolutionary Organization of Peoples in Arms (Organización Revolucionario del 
Pueblo en Armas or ORPA). The former, who first appeared in 1972, was linked to the 
CUC142 and was mainly active in the western highlands. Its ideological framework is 
coherent with Marxist tenets of class action and economic forces determining political 
results, but it blends them with the specificity of Guatemalan society. Particularly aware 
of the need to downplay the secular differences between ladinos and indígenas, they 
consider “exploitation and oppression as complementary parts of a social system 
affecting both Indians and ladinos.”143 Their most original elaboration is perhaps the so-
called “ethnic-national contradiction,” defined simultaneously as the social, cultural, and 
political domination of indigenous people by the capitalist elites and the urgency to 
eradicate the economic and political foundation that makes this exploitation possible.144 
To this end, they propose the creation of a “New Multinational Guatemala”145 where 
indigenous people and non-Indians could collaborate and achieve an equitable 
distribution of resources. 
 ORPA, also active in the western highlands, was reportedly the “most Indian” of 
all the armed groups.146 Its program, by considering racism an integral part of bourgeois 
exploitation towards indigenous people,147 had space for both Mayan identity concerns 
and the Marxist revolution in general.148 By affirming that “the destiny of [all] the 
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exploited is thus indissolubly linked to the destiny of the [racially] oppressed,”149 ORPA 
placed an unprecedented focus on the necessity to involve native people in the revolution. 
 1982 saw the unification of the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and the PGT into the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca or URNG), whose new program aimed at a “popular, democratic and 
patriotic society.”150 This pooling of efforts and coordination of strategy was prompted 
by the massive campaign of counterinsurgency of those years, when State violence 
escalated to the point that acts of genocide were committed against parts of the Mayan 
population.151 Although the counterrevolution considerably diminished indigenous 
activism while weakening the armed guerrillas, it could not annihilate political 
opposition. As highlands were more and more controlled by the army, who established 
“model villages” and “civil guards,”152 the clandestine insurgency was still able to appeal 
to peasants and the civil war continued until the unity of the armed forces disintegrated 
and rumors of the genocide began to spread outside Guatemala.  
  Porras describes the Guatemalan peace process as a “fenómeno hijo de su 
tiempo,”153 in that it could not have happened at a different time. He identifies four main 
trends that modernized Guatemalan society and contributed to its harmonization: a higher 
demand for education, a greater mobilization of society, and the increasing activism of 
two strata of the population, namely women and indigenous people.154 
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 The 1996 Peace Accords, with the signing of six agreements featuring, inter alia, 
indigenous rights (“Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous People”), generic 
human rights, agrarian reform, and the modalities of political assimilation of the URNG, 
reconciled the State with its citizens for the first time after the spring decade. Such a 
remarkable example of mediation and political compromise did not end Guatemalan 
political and social shortcomings but it did mark the beginning of a State accountable to 
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Chapter 5 – The Case of Peru 
5.1 – General Considerations 
 The Spanish conquest has affected the Andes in a very peculiar way. Given its 
specific geography, with impenetrable chains of mountains and difficult living 
conditions, this area has preserved indigenous culture, perhaps more than any other Latin 
American territory. However, over the years Western ideas managed to permeate such 
secluded region, to a point that the endogenous element (so-called “nativism” or 
indigenismo) could hardly be dissociated from the exogenous or “colonial” one. Yet, this 
process of assimilation has been arduous: the entire history of the Andes is, in fact, 
characterized by native rebellion, State authoritarianism, and military repression.  
 A country like Peru is no exception. The dichotomy between liberal ideas and 
native traditions155 that characterized the young republic after its nineteenth century 
independence is still alive nowadays. More importantly, this inherent contradiction might 
account for the most violent rebel movement ever encountered in the Andean region: the 
Shining Path. Initially a mixture of Maoist thought and Incaic mythology, such a terrorist 
group has ended up falling into the trap of a radicalized ideology that has precipitated 
Peru into chaos for twenty years. The Shining Path has tried to solve the five-century old 
opposition between the native and the European element by annihilating the former and 
embracing a foreign-based theory of development grounded on armed struggle. The 
resulting civil war and the government’s response to it has halted the path to democracy 
that Peru was slowly, but steadily following since its free elections of 1980. In this sense, 
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the “Fujimori tsunami”156 and the ensuing scandals linked to his tenure could be seen as 
both a direct consequence of the bloodshed caused by the terrorist group and as the 
reaction of a State with poor institutionalization and loose control over its population. 
 5.2 – Historical Background 
 Although the antecedents of the Shining Path could be mainly found in the 
Peruvian political history of the second half of the twentieth century, it is useful to briefly 
refer to the colonial times and to the periods that followed the country’s independence 
from Spain in 1824. As everywhere else in Latin America, Spanish conquistadores 
exploited and subdued native populations, whose numbers plummeted from nine million 
to one million in the short span of seventy years after Francisco Pizarro’s arrival in 
1531.157 The discovery of silver mines briefly after, transformed the region into an “El 
Dorado” for the Spanish crown, but considerably precipitated the tragic conditions of 
Inca descendants, who were enslaved158 and controlled through a hierarchical 
bureaucracy. The rigidity of the colonial system would be a defining and long-term 
feature in Peru’s social fabric, typically divided into a white or creole oligarchy and an 
Indian or mestizo (mixture of indigenous and white or creole population) lower class.  
 Indigenous people’s isolation and disenfranchisement are also linked to the 
geographic reality of Peru, a country where three different environments coexist. While 
the white elite has historically been located in the small coastal strip (costa) that is also 
home to the capital, Lima, the Andean highlands (sierra) and the jungle (selva) account 
for about 90 percent of the country’s land and almost half of the population, typically of 
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indigenous origins.159 The cyclical boom and bursts of Peruvian economy have 
considerably altered the demographic patterns of the nation, generating a migratory flow 
from the Andean region to the coast, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. These population movements have had nonetheless a small impact on the 
Peruvian-specific duality between actual limeños, namely the traditional oligarchy in 
whose hands lay the bulk of the country’s wealth, and serranos, or peasants and Indians 
coming from the sierra. One could indeed represent the entire history of the country, 
from the Indian upheavals of Manco Inca and Túpac Amaru II (1536160 and 1780,161 
respectively) to the Shining Path’s terrorist attacks, with the image of a rich and coast-
based entrepreneurship and a poor peasantry confined to the hardships of the Andean 
mountains or the impenetrable Amazonian jungle.  
 Politics at the end of the 1800s and at the beginning of the twentieth century was 
done for and made exclusively by the elites. Economic performance, related to the 
oscillating prices of commodities such as guano, sugar, cotton, fishmeal, rubber, copper, 
and oil, strongly influenced the political stability of Peru and encouraged a colonial type 
of land distribution. Cotton and sugar haciendas, run by the white oligarchy or by 
European landowners, were exploiting indigenous people and mestizos through a feudal 
system of tributes and forced labor (encomiendas), while mineral resources were in the 
hand of foreign companies.162 The frequent changes of government of the young 
Peruvian Republic reflected the nation’s fluctuating economic fate. In no circumstances, 
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however, did the State attempt to reach out to the indigenous and peasant masses that 
were paying the price for this export-led economy.  
 Rudolph traces back the origins of the modern political system to the dictatorship 
of Augusto Leguía (1919-1930) that sparked popular outrage and opposition and gave 
birth to the first Peruvian “mass-based political organizations.”163 Among them, the 
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana 
or APRA) and the Peruvian Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Perú or PCP) are 
particularly relevant for the ideology that they espoused and the importance they would 
have in future political alliances and outcomes.  
 APRA was founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in 1924. Although the 
party’s ideology would change in the course of the years, leaning more and more towards 
the right side of the political spectrum, APRA was originally a true revolutionary 
movement. Strongly criticizing foreign “imperialism,” Haya de la Torre advocated for a 
Latin American way to social and economic development, as opposed to capitalism, 
socialism, or fascism.164 Nationalism and economic autarchy were considered to be the 
right tools to address Peru’s dependency from countries like the United States. While 
“aprist” ideas were quickly spreading throughout the country, encountering the favor of 
working classes and students, a young intellectual, José Carlos Mariátegui, began to 
distance himself from Haya de la Torre’s views and created the first Peruvian Socialist 
Party in 1928,165 shortly after transformed into the PCP. Mariátegui’s original 
contribution to communist ideology was its “peruvianization.”  He believed that only the 
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peasantry could initiate a revolution in the Andean region and that the existence of such a 
massive indigenous population, referred to as “human capital,”166 constituted Peru’s main 
advantage in this regard. In his analysis, the Spanish conquest was ultimately the root 
cause of the feudalization and extreme poverty that was plaguing Peruvian society, and 
the indigenous peasants were the ones hit the most by the backwardness imposed on them 
by the colonizers. Therefore, he relied on universities as the focal points for peasants’ 
education towards the ultimate class fight and socialization of lands, for a mythical return 
to the Golden Ages of the Inca Empire.167 About forty years later, Mariátegui’s ideology 
would be defined as a “shining path” leading to the triumph of armed struggle. 
 Marxist frameworks were the base of the first Peruvian guerrillas of the 1950s and 
1960s, whose ill-fated attempts at subverting the status quo were met with scarce support 
of the local population and a fierce response from the military. However, the experiences 
of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria or 
MIR) and of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional or ELN) 
greatly affected subsequent government policies. The military, which since the 1930s had 
repeatedly intervened in Peruvian politics, started to focus on the rural population, 
attaching increasing importance to the ethnic question and the distribution of lands. In its 
view, the guerrilla warfare of those years was caused by the unequal allotment of arable 
land, on which the lives of so many indigenous campesinos depended. Appeasing the 
peasants would mean eradicating any future armed rebellions.168  
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 In this context, the encompassing Agrarian Reform Law of General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado (1969) is easier to understand. Driven by the quest for national security and by 
a more pragmatic nationalism, the reform entailed the expropriation of private latifundia 
and their redistribution to peasant communities in the form of cooperatives or private 
plots.169 The agrarian structure of Peru thus shifted from a largely ineffective and 
abandoned hacienda to a smaller and more intensely cultivated property, in an effort to 
“benefit not the few but society as a whole.”170 Despite Alvarado’s reformism and his 
ambitions for financial independence, the economic crisis that characterized the first half 
of the 1970s led to wide discontent and to the General’s removal. The military 
government that succeeded in 1975 was far more conservative than its predecessor and 
actually recanted many reforms implemented under Alvarado’s tenure.171 By 1980 a 
civilian would be elected as the President of Peru, in the typical alternation that had 
characterized the nation’s politics for the whole twentieth century. Fernando Belaúnde 
Terry, who had been previously deposed in the armed forces’ coup of 1968, was initially 
more preoccupied by the threat of another military golpe than by the presence of a small 
terrorist group that began its attacks by burning the ballots of Chuschi, Ayacucho, during 
the presidential elections. However, 17 May 1980 marked the beginning of the Shining 
Path’s declaration of war to the Peruvian State that was to represent the major trouble for 
the Belaúnde administration. 
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5.3 – The Shining Path and the Civil War 
 The war unleashed by the Shining Path was “the most intense, extensive and 
prolonged episode of violence in the entire history of the (Peruvian) Republic.”172 The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission created in 2001 to investigate the events from May 
1980 to November 2000 calculated that the estimated number of victims could be as high 
as 69,280 and that the Shining Path was responsible for around 54 percent of such human 
losses.173 Moreover, the report of the Commission highlights how this unprecedented 
violence targeted the weakest, poorest, and less educated strata of the population, namely 
the indigenous communities of campesinos living in remote Andean areas.174 These 
numbers and findings show the anomaly of the Peruvian civil war. Never before had a 
Latin American guerrilla group attacked its own population that systematically and 
brutally. Never before had the ethnic problem represented both the justification and the 
outcome of a conflict.  
 To be sure, the Shining Path phenomenon can be explained with the charismatic 
personality of its leader, Abimael Guzmán Reinoso. However, the movement and its 
ideological dogmatism is also connected to the fervent political debate that engaged the 
Peruvian intelligentsia in the second half of the twentieth century, as well as to the twelve 
years of military government that preceded Belaúnde’s election in 1980. The period of 
Velasco’s radical reforms followed by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez’ counter 
reforms had seen the increased mobilization of society as a response to the armed forces’ 
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repression of political parties.175 In particular, Velasco’s ambitious State reform, 
encompassing agriculture, education, and governmental bureaucracy, could not solve the 
institutionalization problems that Peru had been suffering since its independence. The 
military’s suppression of parties triggered the mushrooming of left-wing political groups, 
whose multiplication was also an unintended consequence of the expansion of the 
education system under Velasco’s regime.176  
 Within these Marxist groups, Maoism was the dominant current in the 1960s and 
mid-1970s. Its view of the Peruvian society as “semifeudal” and of the military 
government as “fascist”177 would be one of the hallmarks of the Shining Path’s ideology. 
The group was in fact founded in 1969 by Abimael Guzmán, a university professor who 
was also the leader of the Communist Committee in one of the poorest regions of Peru, 
Ayacucho.178 Prior to creating the Shining Path as a faction of the PCP (its formal name 
was Partido Comunista del Perú- Por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui or PCP-SL), 
Guzmán was well involved in the intellectual debate about the pure essence of Marxism 
and immediately sided with the pro-Chinese faction. Its literal interpretation of Mao’s 
thought is what sets Sendero apart from the rest of the Left. While refusing to admit that 
the Peruvian reality of those years had somehow changed with respect to the 
backwardness of the beginning of the century,179 the group considers itself the only real 
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revolutionary party and dismisses other Marxist strands as too compromising.180 It is in 
this sense that Stern defines the appearance of the Shining Path “both ‘within’ and 
’against’ history.”181  
 As already mentioned, the Shining Path’s dogmatism and lack of connection with 
Peruvian reality stem from the very contradictions of the Andean country. Indeed, 
Mariátegui’s effort to reconcile the indigenous component of Peruvian culture with the 
specifics of Marxism is allegedly predicated by senderistas and evident in the name of 
the group itself. However, Guzmán’s elaboration is far less problematic than Mariátegui’s 
for two reasons: on the one hand, his vision is completely absorbed by ideology to the 
detriment of indigenism, on the other hand, the view of Sendero’s leader is a mere 
consequence of the intellectual discourse that dominated the political scenes since the 
1920s.182 De la Cadena advances the argument that the increasing radicalization of 
intellectuals occurred in the mid-1970s did not eliminate the racist and hierarchical views 
that always typified Peruvian elites. Whereas the word “race” was now substituted by the 
term “class,” Marxist theorists could not eliminate the traditional paternalism towards 
native people and simply imposed the concept of “class consciousness” to explain the 
reality of their country. In doing so, they continued to avoid the ethnic problem inherent 
to Peru, just like the bourgeoisie and the white elites had done before them. Guzmán’s 
intransigence and utter disregard for the indigenous question is, therefore, a by-product of 
the intellectual milieu of those years and not only a result of his mental rigidity. 
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 Guzman’s character and personality traits are nevertheless crucial in accounting 
for Sendero’s cruelty and unwillingness to mediate with the State or ally with other leftist 
organizations. Born in Arequipa in 1934 as an illegitimate son,183 Guzmán was appointed 
as a professor in the San Cristóbal de Huamanga University of Ayacucho in 1962.184 
After witnessing the several splits of the Peruvian Communist Party, he unilaterally 
embraced Maoism by creating the Shining Path and he began a massive operation of 
indoctrination and recruitment of senderistas within the university. His charisma lured 
dozens of students into the cause of the Shining Path, while his inflexibility led to a 
severe purge of the academic faculty.185 When the group attacked for the first time, 
Guzmán was already considered as the only and absolute leader and was referred to as 
“President Gonzalo.” The cult of his personality and his unchallenged ideology, also 
known as “Gonzalo Thought,” exemplify the extent to which his influence had come to 
comprehend every single aspect of the terrorist group’s actions. Indeed, the terrorist 
leader was what Milton Rokeach would describe as an authoritarian and close-minded 
personality.186 
 The overall view of Sendero Luminoso was that Peru could attain real justice only 
by subverting the existing government with the help of a phased guerrilla movement, 
whose ultimate goal was to create the actual possibility for a spontaneous revolution.187 
In line with Mao’s directions, the group needed to rely on bases from which spreading the 
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revolutionary ideas to the populace at large. Peasantry would constitute the backbone of 
such a fight that was meant to end with the conquest of the cities. In this regard, the 
Gonzalo Thought identifies violence as an absolute requisite of the popular fight: 
“(Revolutionary violence) is what allows us to solve the fundamental contradictions with 
an army and through the popular war.”188 Guzmán goes further, by demanding his 
comrades to be ready and willing to give up their lives for the senderista cause, in what is 
commonly known as the “quota:” “Marx, Lenin, and principally Mao Zedong have armed 
us. They have taught us about the quota and what it means to annihilate in order to 
preserve…We began planning for the bloodbath in 1980 because we knew it had to 
come.”189  
 Peru’s response to the proliferation of terrorist attacks was at first inadequate. 
From his side, Belaúnde largely underestimated the senderista threat, confusing it for a 
phenomenon of petty criminality and permitting its quick expansion from the Ayacucho 
and Apurímac departments to vast areas of the Peruvian territory. Only when the conflict 
reached a national scale in 1982 did the government react by entrusting the Armed Forces 
with eradicating the terrorist menace. 190 The following years would witness the 
escalation of the violence perpetrated by both the military and the Shining Path. 
Particularly, the massacre of about 249 inmates committed by the armed forces while 
crushing a riot in three different prisons in 1986 (the second year of tenure of President 
Alan García)191 seem to mark the peak of the civil confrontation. This perception proved 
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to be wrong when President Fujimori’s (1990-2000) counter insurgency plan kicked in, 
with his infamous anti-terrorist death squad, the “Grupo Colina” created in 1991 by the 
Intelligence Service,192 and his 1992 autogolpe, by which he closed the Congress and 
called for new elections and a new Parliament. A few months later, Abimael Guzmán 
would be captured in Lima and kept in custody ever since.  
 The troubled human rights records of the Peruvian government, especially under 
the Fujimori administration, are yet not comparable with the atrocious bloodshed initiated 
by the Shining Path against the rural masses and private citizens alike. Considered the 
main vessel of the popular revolution, campesinos would rarely join the senderista cause, 
mainly because they did not understand it. While Guzmán’s indoctrination was directed 
to students of the province who were usually from the lower classes, the bulk of 
indigenous communities resisted the Gonzalo Thought due to the fact that it refused to 
comprehend their Andean tradition and culture. By pretending to wipe out anything that 
would jeopardize the Maoist armed struggle, the senderistas were depriving the peasant 
communities of their own organizations, religion, and justice.193 They were forcing 
Indians to trade their millenary civilization for a violence that was completely 
inexplicable to them. Although the increasing violations and murders carried out by the 
armed forces did play in favor of the Shining Path’s recruitment in some indigenous 
communities, the situation would quickly reverse. Not only was the military capable of 
winning the peasants over with a mix of “intimidation and persuasion,”194 it also helped 
Andean communities to organize their own self-defense committees, called “rondas 
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campesinas.” The rondas arguably weakened the effectiveness of the Shining Path’s 
attacks in the mountains195 and empowered indigenous communities previously isolated 
to tackle the problem of terrorism by themselves. Ultimately, they represented the 
unbridgeable gap that existed between native people and rebels.  
 The capture of President Gonzalo significantly reduced Sendero’s actions, which 
ended almost completely in 1999 with the seizure of his second highest-ranking 
commander, Oscar Ramírez Durand, alias Feliciano. Finally, the abandonment of the 
government by the exiled Fujimori one year later would end the two-decade long 
Peruvian civil war. Still, the way towards real democracy awaits a clear 
acknowledgement by all segments of the population of the urgency to first recognize and 
subsequently tackle the ethnic cleavage that divides Peru. The “other paths” to social 










                                                
195 Ibid., p. 243. 
  66 
Chapter 6 – A Critical Assessment 
6.1 – Testing the Hypothesis 
 The different outcomes of armed struggle in Guatemala and Peru prompt a series 
of reflections. What were the main determinants of insurgents’ moderate success or lack 
thereof in advocating for substantial change? Did the Guatemalan and Peruvian guerrillas 
use a distinct approach towards the ethnic problem? If so, what did they actually achieve 
in terms of advancement of native people’s rights? The civil wars in these two Latin 
American countries will provide useful tools to test my initial hypothesis that argues in 
favor of the chief role played by indigenous people in the performance of Marxist rebel 
groups. They will also show whether this interaction between indios and ideological fight 
is a mutually beneficial one or if we are in front of a “win-lose” situation.  
 To verify the accuracy of my hypothesis, I will measure two variables: the degree 
of Marxist armed groups’ support for indigenous grievances and the degree of dogmatism 
of insurgents. If my research question proves correct, a low level of ideological rigidity 
combined with a comprehensive program of action should determine a greater 
participation of native population in the cause of the rebels. This, in turn, should be 
linked to a positive or partial success of left-wing guerrillas. In this case, the term 
“success” is not intended in a pure Marxist way. In fact, it does not entail the end of class 
differences and the abolition of private property, but it indicates the point to which 
ideological fight achieves or somehow abets social justice. It is important to point out 
that, in the case studies exposed above, the alleged “success” of Marxist groups is 
determined by more than two aspects, such as State repression and economic factors. 
However, for the purposes of this research, only the inclusion of native people’s concerns 
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and dogmatism will be analyzed, because they are conceived as the two most important 
variables of the research hypothesis. 
6.2 – Degree of Support for Indigenous People’s Grievances 
  Both the URNG and the Shining Path are inspired by ideological frameworks 
whose roots are not Latin American. Their cause, as mentioned in the previous chapters, 
was initially dominant among white and mestizo intellectuals, who were the ones leading 
the rebel movements in both Guatemala and Peru. Subsequently, the two guerrilla groups 
strived to appeal to the masses of peasants and poor indios that constituted the bulk of the 
population. I will now assess if the Marxist rebels’ recruitment among indigenous people 
was based on a genuine commitment to improve their situation of discrimination and 
hardship. To this end, I intend to evaluate the status of native populations during the 
armed conflict by examining indicators such as land distribution, the displacement of 
Indian communities, and the general human rights violations committed against these 
communities.  
 With regard to the first indicator, this research has repeatedly stressed the 
particular connection of indigenous people to their land and how an unequal land 
distribution had impacted negatively on peasant communities whose livelihoods were in 
most cases entirely dependent on agriculture. The case studies presented are examples of 
the extent to which agrarian reform was considered relevant to the stability of the 
countries in question. They also show that left-wing sympathizers were advocating for 
the right to land of indigenous communities. As a matter of fact, land distribution is part 
of both the URNG and the Shining Path’s original program of action. However, it is 
precisely after their declaration of war to the governments of Guatemala and Peru that the 
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paths of the two guerrilla movements diverge. Initially triggered by sovereignty issues 
and led by former military officials, the rebel groups in the Central American country 
would deepen their connection to the Indian cause in the 1970s, with the appearance of 
the EGP and ORPA.196 Although arguing for the conceptual superiority of class conflict 
with regard to ethnicity,197 the Guatemalan rebels had strong ties with campesino 
organizations and included many peasants in their cadres. This aspect and the usual 
pacific coexistence of guerrillas with villagers argue in favor of a certain degree of 
support of the Guatemalan activists for the land grievances of indigenous people. 
Conversely, the senderista approach to Indian rights to land starts with a general 
understanding of the problem and demonstration of solidarity towards peasant 
communities, and ends with an appalling disregard for the agrarian question. Guzmán’s 
doctrine was greatly influenced by the disadvantaged condition of the peasantry in 
Ayacucho (“Ayacucho was useful to discover the peasantry”)198 and by mariateguismo, 
which recognizes the utter importance of the land problem in the perpetuation of 
inequality in Peru.199 But Shining Path’s rebels gradually and inexorably depart from 
these ideas to prioritize the concept of a protracted war to subvert the bourgeois order. 
The actions of Sendero to end peasant agricultural production destined to local markets200 
demonstrate the movement’s distance away from indigenous communities and their land 
concerns. The closure of peasant markets and the end of villager small-scale economy in 
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favor of subsistence agriculture are strong signals of the Shining Path’s disregard for the 
land question.  
 Both conflicts in Guatemala and Peru have uprooted an enormous number of 
indigenous communities by either displacing their members or by unweaving their social 
fabric. The main difference lies in the responsibilities for these acts: while the State was 
the main agent of oppression for Mayan villages, Sendero has arguably been held 
accountable for the majority of indigenous refugees and the destruction of the structure of 
Andean villages. The CEH (Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification) affirms 
that displacement of the population was one of the army’s main counterinsurgency 
tactics.201 In addition, the Guatemalan army’s efforts to dismantle indigenous 
communities by controlling them are evident in the formation of the notorious “model 
villages” and “civil guards.” These strategies were in fact aimed at “punishing” peasant 
collaboration with armed rebels, a fact that proves a certain degree of peaceful 
coexistence of the two sides that seemed absent in the Peruvian case. During the years of 
Sendero’s indoctrination, its recruitment was targeted to the middle class and the rural 
population; its ideas of social justice and a Maoist peasant revolution were appealing to 
those Andean villagers that had not benefited from General Velasco’s agrarian reform. 
Nevertheless, peasants distanced themselves from the movement when its violent actions 
multiplied and were increasingly directed to their communities. When terrorists were 
infiltrating the villages, in fact, they demanded total abnegation to their Maoist cause and 
killed village authorities and prominent members in order to establish their own concept 
of order. Forced recruitment and the destruction of indigenous civil society on the one 
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hand and state violence on the other hand caused a previously unseen phenomenon of 
internal migration from the Andes region to Lima and other cities along the coast.202 The 
number of internally displaced persons during the Peruvian civil war has been estimated 
to 400,000-600,000.203 
 Violations of indigenous people’s rights, the third indicator, have been 
widespread in both countries, reaching even the scale of genocide in the case of 
Guatemala. With a percentage of 83.3 percent of victims, the Mayan population was the 
most affected by political violence in the Central American nation.204 Examining the four 
major human rights violations that occurred during the conflict (arbitrary executions, 
torture, forced disappearance, and sexual violence), the CEH established that the 
Guatemalan army was responsible for 93 percent of these acts, while the URNG was 
found guilty of a mere 3 percent of human rights’ abuses and murders of civilians.205 
These numbers are self-explanatory. In the case of Peru, investigations of the TRC (Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission) show that more than half of the victims and 
desaparecidos (54 percent) were attributable to the Shining Path, while the Peruvian 
government caused the death and forced disappearance of about one third of the total 
casualties.206 The TRC further clarified that political violence did match ethnic 
distribution and rural indigence, with 85 percent of the victims being from the poorest 
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departments of Peru (among these, 40 percent were from Ayacucho)207 and that 57 
percent of senderista’s attacks were directed to peasants.208 The most infamous example 
of such “selective violence”209 can be found in the Lucanamarca massacre of 1983, when 
69 villagers were brutally killed by the Shining Path in retaliation for the murder of two 
terrorist activists.210 
 The data gathered by the CEH and the TRC depict two very different scenarios. 
Guatemalan guerrillas showed a pragmatic and, in certain cases, even authentic support 
for indigenous people’s concerns and problems through effective links to native 
communities and a consistent respect for their right to land and general human rights. The 
exact opposite attitude can be found in Peru, where Sendero Luminoso quickly deceived 
peasants and used their hamlets as “support bases”211 to sustain their warfare as long as 
possible. Military strategy proved more important than indigenous support right from the 
start for the Maoist group. The fact that its violence would routinely target members of 
peasant communities during the rest of the civil conflict is indicative of the huge 
discrepancy that existed between the terrorist movement’s goals and Andean populations’ 
interests. In light of these considerations, I will assign a high to moderate degree of 
support for indigenous people’s grievances to the Guatemalan URNG and a low degree to 
the Peruvian guerrilla.  
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6.3 – Degree of Dogmatism 
  Measuring dogmatism is a daunting task, due to the fact that it cannot be 
quantified in a scientific way, but it has to be inferred from other categories. In this 
research, I will consider a Marxist ideology to be dogmatic if it is characterized by low 
flexibility in terms of adaptation to the reality of a specific country and if it does not 
foresee any participation in the electoral game.  
 Guatemalan guerrillas were arguably capable of adjusting their ideology to the 
evolving situation on the ground and to the responses of both the population and the 
government. Most of the cadres of the EGP comprised former members of the 1960s 
armed groups that had failed at launching the revolution back then. Their past flaws made 
them strategically wiser and more sensitive to grassroots support, so that their ideology 
kept the main Marxist tenets but adopted an “indigenista focus.”212 A further 
confirmation of their ability to compromise is the 1982 unification of the four armed 
groups under the same political entity, the URNG, which required “a greater degree of 
cooperation.”213 As much as the Marxist revolutionaries needed to unite in order to cope 
with the ferocious repression of the Guatemalan army, such a decision could not have 
taken place in the absence of a certain tolerance for different views and opinions. Perhaps 
the greatest example of the rebels’ ideological flexibility is their very resolution to 
terminate the armed struggle and initiate a dialogue with the Guatemalan government. 
Porras offers a comprehensive historical background for this memorable event. Both the 
international context (Gorbachev’s Perestroika in 1985 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989) and the regional one (Peace Accords in Nicaragua and El Salvador) steered the 
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consensus of the URNG members towards a peaceful negotiation.214 As a consequence of 
the failure of communist ideas in the political realm and of the non-sustainability of 
socialism in the economic sphere, the Guatemalan Marxist guerrilla chose the realistic 
approach of a peaceful settlement. URNG resolved the inherent contradiction between a 
utopian socialist armed struggle and a fundamentally capitalist society by relinquishing 
the arms in favor of democracy.215 The long and difficult path to the Peace Accords 
demonstrated the URNG’s will to be part of the Guatemalan party system, which was 
formalized on 12 December 1996 with the legalization of the group and its gradual 
integration into the country’s political life.216 The abandonment of pure Marxist ideas in 
the context of a situation that made them unfeasible and the acceptance of a democratic 
political role that condemned violence allow us to perceive the URNG as a fairly low 
dogmatic group. 
 On the contrary, Abimael Guzmán’s terrorist group is believed to be the most 
“totalitarian”217 and dogmatic movement of the whole Latin American region, 
comparable more to “religious faith”218 than to a politically armed guerrilla movement. 
Several elements confirm this analysis. The timeframe of the Shining Path is indicative in 
this regard. Guzmán’s choice to espouse Maoist ideas at a time when the whole Peruvian 
left was distancing itself from the Chinese position as well as his declaration of war in the 
midst of the first Peruvian democratic elections in decades are indeed symptoms of a 
myopic attitude. In addition, absence of ideological flexibility can be derived from the 
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structural framework of the Gonzalo Thought. Although announced as a creative and 
“native” strand of Maoism, the Gonzalo Thought was a mere repetition of it and 
comprised mainly of constant quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong. Hinojosa 
describes the senderista ideology as “dogmatic” precisely in virtue of its literal 
interpretation of Marxism “as a repertory of quotes.”219 In fact, even a cursory reading of 
Guzmán’s works reveals endless references to Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, and this 
alone shows the lack of an original ideological elaboration that was key in a country like 
Peru. In Degregori’s view, the inflexibility of Sendero is the main cause of its collapse. 
The terrorists’ biased analysis of the situation on the ground, their refusal to understand 
Andean culture, and their “optimistic fatalism”220 constituted the flaws of the Maoist 
movement’s strategy and informed their ideological rigidity. The hierarchical structure of 
Sendero Luminoso, based on the personal cult of its leader, called “President,” is yet 
another proof of dogmatism. The party was composed of a Permanent Committee that 
comprised Guzmán, his wife Augusta de la Torre, and Elena Iparraguirre, his future 
partner. All decisions were taken by this Committee and then communicated in writing to 
a Central Committee who would distribute the documents to the local bases. 221 
Subversion or frank opposition to President Gonzalo was not only discouraged, but also 
brutally punished through public humiliation or murder. The group’s ideological rigidity 
manifested itself also in the refusal to collaborate with the government or with other 
leftist movements. During the years of the civil war, Sendero responded to the 
government’s repression with mass violence and increasing acts of terrorism that were 
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aimed at provoking the State in lieu of appeasing it. The peace agreement that Guzmán 
accepted a year after his capture was not his initiative222 and sounded more as the 
testament of a defeated rebel than as a spontaneous acknowledgement of Peruvian reality. 
6.4 – Final Implications 
 We have seen how the approach used by the Central American Marxist groups 
towards the indigenous cause was essentially opposed to the one applied by the Shining 
Path of Peru. These different attitudes shaped the ideologies of the guerrilla movements 
in two divergent directions: more tolerant and mindful of the ethnic problem in the case 
of Guatemala; fanatic and extraneous to native people’s culture and reality in the case of 
Peru. For my initial hypothesis to be correct, a high level of ideological adaptability 
coupled with a low level of dogmatism should elicit consistent indigenous participation in 
the armed struggle, which, in turn, should positively impact the success of the rebellion 
itself.  
 The URNG displayed support for indigenous grievances and a low degree of 
ideological closemindness. As a result, their rebel cadres included many Mayans, the 
majority of which truly shared the rebels’ vision because it reflected and embraced the 
ethnic differences of Guatemala. While Porras describes the guerrillas as mainly 
composed of Indians,223 Handy compares the Mayan participation in the revolution to a 
“torrent.”224 I argue that the relative good performance of the URNG can be linked, inter 
alia, to the high levels of indigenous mobilization in the conflict. In fact, not only have 
native population engagement facilitated the movement of the rebels within the country. 
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The massive scale of indigenous rights violations committed by the government during 
the conflict has also given the guerrillas an international and national leverage that they 
could not have gained otherwise. One could argue that both sides, indigenous and rebels, 
have mutually benefited from each other: while the URNG found in indigenous 
populations their best allies, it also advocated for the advancement of their rights through 
the Peace Accords, specifically the “Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous 
People.” However, the failed implementation of such agreements shows that the 
threshold of real engagement in favor of native people is yet to be met. 
 On the other hand, the Shining Path’s ideology has been assessed as lacking 
support for the Andean populations’ concerns and as being extremely dogmatic. A 
consequence of this has been the failure to involve the peasantry in the armed struggle. 
The ideological framework traced by Guzmán was incomprehensible to them and its 
concepts of “prolonged war”225 and mass violence were incompatible with Andean 
culture. The establishment of rondas campesinas indicates that the level of intolerance of 
indigenous peasants towards the Shining Path had reached its peak. At the same time, 
such civil guards helped the government in the almost complete military defeat of the 
terrorists. The Peruvian case thus proves how a substantial absence of indigenous support 
has been one of the factors that frustrated Sendero’s attempt at Maoist revolution. It also 
reveals the pitfalls of radical ideology: besides the annihilation of the terrorist group, the 
civil conflict has left no winners. Peruvian democracy stepped back to authoritarianism 
under Fujimori, while indigenous peasants suffered from both the war’s hardships and its 
massive political violence. 
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Chapter 7 – Concluding Remarks 
7.1 – Political Implications and Lessons Learned 
 My research has shown that guerrilla movements of Guatemala and Peru have 
used Marxist frameworks differently, achieving almost opposite results, which were 
significantly tied to the level of indigenous mobilization and its collaboration with the 
left-wing rebel groups. In this interaction, ideological radicalism has proved to damage 
both insurgents at large and native populations in particular, especially because it thwarts 
a thorough and realistic understanding of Latin American societies with a significant 
ethnic component. Such conclusions generate lessons learned that could be useful in the 
analysis of the ongoing nation-building process of these fairly recent countries of the sub-
continent and might even be applicable beyond the region.  
 Firstly, the type of approach used by the government to terminate the civil conflict 
bears important consequences on the future reintegration of combatants from both sides 
into civil society. Without the assimilation of disenfranchised segments of the population, 
especially indigenous ones, countries are bound to be politically unstable and unsafe for 
their citizens, with all the negative repercussions that the absence of rule of law 
implicates.  
 Secondly, if one considers that the main cause of indigenous participation in 
Marxist armed groups was their secular social and political exclusion, it is clear how the 
construction of a participatory society at all levels could prevent future conflicts, besides 
representing a major result for indigenous rights movements across the region. Therefore, 
the role that ethnicity comes to play in post-conflict Latin American states is paramount 
for the credibility of state-society relations. Government officials and political analysts 
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should consider a multicultural solution as opposed to the assimilationist and “top-down” 
approach used before and during the wars. One of the lessons that indigenous 
mobilization linked to political violence has pointed out to governments is that the 
unitary state model is not the only possibility nowadays and could, under certain 
circumstances as the ones present in most Latin American countries, be deleterious.226 
7.2 – Reintegration of Former Combatants 
 Comparing the civil wars of the two case studies analyzed in this research, we 
have observed how the Guatemalan government was able to negotiate peace through a 
long and difficult process of mediation that showed both parties’ will to collaborate. 
Conversely, the outcome of the Peruvian conflict was deemed devastating for all 
protagonists, also due to a lack of compromise and intransigence found in representatives 
of the rebels and the state. However, these conclusions can be further expanded to the 
post-conflict period, as government’s attitude towards former members of armed groups 
does influence their decision to reintegrate into society or to consider joining other rebel 
movements. 
 The destabilizing potential of former combatants is an element that needs to be 
addressed by all governments that experienced acute phases of social upheavals and 
disorders. It is, in fact, featured in United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
strategies under the “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration” program (DDR), 
which has become an essential part of the implementation of peace agreements across the 
world, from Timor Leste to Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.227 
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Particularly, in countries like Guatemala and Peru, where the land issue and lack of 
economic and political opportunities for large parts of the population is intertwined with 
the ethnic problem, the reintegration of demobilized rebels and counterinsurgency 
elements should become a priority for state officials. Efforts at reintegration can range 
from the inclusion of former guerrilla members into political life, as in the Guatemalan 
case with part of the Peace Accords,228 to social and economic policies targeted at the 
reconstruction of civil society. However, for a reintegration to be effective, governments 
should design their programs factoring the repatriation of internally displaced persons as 
a starting point. As mentioned in Chapter 6, state violence in Guatemala and terrorism in 
Peru have caused high levels of internal migration and have uprooted thousands of 
campesinos and guerrilla members. Thus, expediting their return to the villages could 
foster community-based programs of reinsertion into civil society and into the job 
market. 
 In Guatemala and Peru (and Latin America in general), state officials need to pay 
particular attention to programs boosting political and economic participation of ethnic 
minorities, in order to avoid relapsing into conflict. I have already mentioned how the 
lack of equal distribution of resources and of social justice more broadly, as inheritance 
of colonialism, have been main factors in the surge of Marxist movements and in their 
appeal to native populations. Hence, governments’ failure to acknowledge their past 
mistakes and to show will to redress them through inclusive nation-building policies, 
could only mean further violence, an increasing isolation of indigenous communities, and 
an escalating level of domestic and transnational criminality, as the latest trends in the 
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Central American region are dramatically showing. Post-conflict societies that stigmatize 
and ostracize demobilized combatants instead of incorporating them generate more and 
more disillusioned and devalued citizens, who fall in the hands of organized crime or 
ideological guerrilla movements or both, as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) exemplify. 
 Although the Guatemalan Peace Accords represented an encouraging step in the 
direction of reintegration of armed groups into society, the country has not met 
international expectations and has for the most part not complied with its commitment of 
responsibility and inclusion in the social and political sphere. As a result of this flawed 
approach to reintegration of a wide portion of the constituency, rule of law in Guatemala 
has consistently worsened. The Peruvian case seems to have elicited a slightly more 
positive result, despite its initial phases of authoritarianism under Fujimori, perhaps due 
to the country’s better economic performance in comparison with Guatemala.229 Yet, 
little efforts have been made, aside from the constitution of the TRC, for a meaningful 
understanding of the root causes of terrorism and ideological dogmatism in Peru.  
 Overall, it looks as if Latin American societies were still “in denial” and were 
refusing to admit that ethnic cleavages continue to exist even after the end of their civil 
wars, despite the negotiation of peace agreements and a return to democracy. That is why 
Latin American countries should concentrate more on the implementation of existing 
policies aimed at reconstructing and reconciling society with the state, rather than at 
generating a new set of programs with the help of foreign aid, as they have been doing for 
decades. In this regard, national ownership at all levels of outreach strategies directed to 
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citizens, particularly the most vulnerable ones such as former combatants, would be an 
asset for the credibility of post-conflict national programs.230 
7.3 – The Construction of a Multicultural State and the Role of Ethnicity 
 During colonialism and even more so after independence, Latin American 
countries have addressed the ethnic question unsatisfactorily, at times ignoring it with a 
view to assimilate minorities into the mainstream culture, at times exploiting indigenous 
culture for economic purposes. Boasting tolerance internationally and acting in a 
paternalist way towards minorities domestically served to disguise state officials’ poor 
appreciation of native populations traditions, considered as a backward legacy of pre-
Hispanic times. It has become evident, throughout this research, how such an attitude has 
backfired against governments, by widening the gap between significant numbers of 
indigenous groups and the Creole elites. The resulting civil conflicts and the transnational 
indigenous rights networks that acquired public attention in the 1980s have obliged these 
societies recovering from political violence to finally face the problem of ethnicity.  
 The 1990s featured a trend of legislative reforms in the Latin American area 
whose activity, certainly in the cases of Guatemala and Peru, was stimulated by the end 
of the respective civil conflicts. While the former country witnessed the signing of 
important agreements between the state and civil society, especially indigenous 
representatives, the latter changed its Constitution to acknowledge the pluralist nature of 
the nation and signed the ILO Convention 169 in 1993,231 a few months after the capture 
of Abimael Guzmán. It has been previously and repeatedly noticed that these attempts at 
addressing the ethnic question have been confined to the legal and formal sphere of state 
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building only and that the implementation stage has never fully taken off. Several causes, 
as lack of infrastructure or the looming international financial crisis, might have 
prevented these countries to head in the direction of real plurality and participatory 
democracy. However, the threat that self-determination of indigenous populations 
allegedly poses to independent nations has certainly played a chief role in governments’ 
halfhearted legislative and constitutional reforms. In fact, indigenous communities’ 
requests for autonomy have been seen, especially in the Central American country, as a 
dangerous trend toward secession or further civil wars, as in the cases of the Former 
Yugoslavia, and have triggered enhanced centralism and authoritarianism.232 However, 
such demands are not only in line with international law, but could also abet the 
streamlining of bureaucracy and boost the efficiency of the state apparatus, if adequately 
understood and successfully realized in the context of a true multicultural nation.  
 The construction of a multicultural state begins with the genuine 
acknowledgement of the importance of plural identities vis-à-vis the single, monolithic 
identity of the Westphalian state. Such a process does begin in the legislative area, and in 
this sense Latin American countries, especially Andean ones, are in compliance, but 
absolutely needs to be accepted at all levels of society, first and foremost by those 
portions of the population that have been segregated for years and still feel disconnected 
from the top of the social pyramid. Therefore, the establishment of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions and the subsequent incorporation of plurality principles in 
the Constitution are useful tools only when coupled with a community-based method, 
whose main foundations are decentralization and the recognition of cultural diversity. 
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Multiculturalism is a mutual process and, as such, should be interiorized by the whole 
constituency in a “bottom-up” approach that empowers citizens and spontaneously aligns 
them with state policies. Besides the legislative field, the main areas of reforms for post-
conflict countries with an ethnic component are: education, land and equal distribution of 
resources, and the judiciary.  
 As for education, the centrifugal tendency of the new multicultural state should 
prompt authorities to create new entities promoting indigenous culture and working at 
designing school programs that fashion bilingualism and are attentive to native traditions. 
I have pointed out in Chapter 5 how marginalization of rural regions has led to the 
radicalization of universities and the indoctrination of students by the Shining Path. In 
light of this, universal access to primary and secondary education should be promoted 
through a statewide effort to build new schools also in remote areas of the countryside or 
by reforming existing institutes and staffing them with competent teachers. Citizens of 
rural centers have to perceive decentralization in a positive way and not as a 
government’s excuse to further isolate and discriminate them. A huge challenge in this 
regard is represented by geography, as Andean communities and Central American 
highland villages are still difficult to reach, despite the technological progress made in 
transportation.  
 The educational reform undergone by the Guatemalan state after the Peace 
Accords highlights the relevance of education in the context of a multicultural nation. 
The setbacks experienced during the negotiation process, according to Cojtí Cuxil, were 
not only due to the government’s intransigency, but also and mainly to an uneven 
leverage displayed by the two parties, whereby the Mayan representatives were unable to 
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match the technical expertise of state officials.233 This experience shows how deeply 
unequal access to education can influence state-civil society relations by nurturing 
discrimination. 
 Social conflicts involving native populations have largely stemmed from land 
issues and a protracted system of internal colonization. A lesson states should draw from 
the relative success of non-dogmatic Marxist frameworks among indigenous 
communities is that neo-liberal policies should follow the same rule, namely refrain from 
universally suitable and foreign-based economic programs. This research has proved that 
radical ideology and ethnicity are not compatible, and yet many Latin American countries 
have embraced economic practices that are completely disconnected from their ethnic 
component and are contributing to the fragmentation of the social fabric. By giving 
priority to economic performance and revenues over social stability, some Latin 
American governments are denying the value of ethnicity and are continuing to blindly 
accept Western models of development, despite ECLAC and dependency theories’ 
reflections. Although the limits of these frameworks have become clear, neo-liberalism 
does not offer a solution to the complex multi-ethnic scene of the Latin American region, 
mainly because it advocates unfettered capitalism to the detriment of indigenous 
communities. Neo-liberalist approaches end up favoring powerful elites with more 
economic opportunities and lead to the urbanization of weak segments of the population, 
usually of indigenous descent, who continue to be left behind in the national effort at 
economic development.  
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 In order to carry out economic reform that is consistent with the pluralist 
principles of the Constitution, governments should formulate ad hoc strategies that are 
both homegrown and mindful of the legacies of colonialism. Contrary to what 
modernization theories predicated, the Latin American region does not necessarily have 
to experiment with the same development stages as European countries have done, but 
needs instead to acknowledge its own diversity. Participatory democracy should start 
from the equal allotment of resources achieved through original economic policies that 
benefit the whole society, taking into account the disadvantaged situation of native 
populations and seeking to redress it.  
 Finally, multiculturalism has to be guaranteed by an independent judiciary able to 
counterbalance the power of the executive. The example of constitutional reform in Peru 
hampered by the legal system should guide future attempts at adapting the country’s main 
charter to the plural character of society.234 This reasoning holds even more true in light 
of the authoritarian and militaristic past of the whole Latin American region. An 
independent judiciary would represent a solution to the problem of representation of civil 
society in nations where the executive power tends to be the privileged stakeholder in all 
negotiations and would ensure a truly plural decision-making process. 
 
 The lessons learned from the case studies of Guatemala and Peru have 
demonstrated that ethnicity, once considered a burden for development, can indeed be 
turned into an advantage for countries that are willing and able to effectively incorporate 
it into their legislations. A threefold approach encompassing educational, economic, and 
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judicial reforms should directly follow the reintegration of former combatants and 
constitutional reforms.  
 More broadly, one could argue that the process of state building subsequent to 
violence spurred by ethnic grievances is essential to the future political and social 
stability of any country with variables similar to the ones present in Guatemala and Peru. 
If multiculturalism is really implemented, it could function as a buffer for the spread of 
radical ideologies and armed groups that thrive on popular discontent and social 
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